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ABSTRACT 
Since the establishment of the Durand Line in 1893 as the international border 
between Afghanistan and British India, the frontier areas on the eastern side of the border 
have not been integrated into the social fabric or political framework of the government.  
Conventional wisdom views integrating the tribes of the FATA as extremely difficult, if 
not impossible.  The real reason is that neither the British nor subsequent Pakistani 
administrations committed the appropriate resources or attention to accomplish the task 
due to a lack of political will.  Geopolitical influences and Islamist militants drove the 
resistance that deemed the effort to integrate the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, an 
area void of significant natural resources, not worth the cost.  The terrorist organizations 
that Pakistan supported both covertly and overtly in the frontier areas are now 
uncontrollable and the very instruments intended to promote the national interests of a 
nuclear armed yet power deficient state pose an existential threat to the government they 
were intended to serve.  Contemporary rhetoric now supports complete integration of the 
FATA into the writ of the Pakistani government.  The good news for those policy makers 
who see this as a daunting task is that no government has really tried. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The borderlands between Pakistan and Afghanistan have been invaded several 
times and claimed, at least nominally, within the domain of numerous civilizations.  
Alexander the Great, the Sassanians, the Kushans, Hun rulers, the Arabs, the Turks, the 
Mughals, Afghan Kings, the Sikhs, and the British all viewed the land encompassing the 
hilly passes that are the gateway between the Indus River Valley and Central Asia as 
falling within their empires.1  Despite any boundaries drawn on a map or mutual 
understandings between Kings and rulers, “the tribal belt as a whole” has escaped 
“subjection to any external power – a freedom symbolized by the failure to impose in it 
any taxation.”2  Quite the opposite has generally occurred, where mighty empires and 
powerful armies offered an allowance for security and unopposed travel through the 
mountain passes instead of facing resistance from the Pashtun tribes. The question I 
intend to explore is why the land now called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA) has never truly been integrated into the controlled areas of an empire or, more 
recently, the legal apparatus of the ruling government.   
B. IMPORTANCE 
The FATA served for centuries as a transit route four countries seeking empire 
and a staging ground for militants fighting to preserve Pashtun traditions or to defend and 
promote Islam against foreign threats.  The invasion of Afghanistan in response to 
September 11 forced many Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda affiliates, and Pakistani Islamists 
into the FATA and adjacent areas of the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) to find a 
safe haven in which to pursue their neo-fundamentalist goals.  The infusion of these 
                                                 
1 Naveed Ahmad Shinwari, Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society 
in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Community Appraisal & Motivation Programme, 
2008), 12. Found at www.understandingfata.org or www.camp.org.pk (accessed September 19, 2009).  
2 Olaf Caroe, The Pathans (London, UK: Macmillan Company Ltd., 1983), xxiii.  The tribal belt 
Caroe refers to here is roughly the agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas.  
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radical Islamists has changed the nature of the threat emanating from the FATA from one 
guided by the Pakistani state to one that has become an existential threat to the state itself 
and has dismantled or assumed control of an already fragile tribal structure.3 
Assuming Pakistan and the U.S. stay the course and bring security and reasonable 
stability to the border area, the question will remain how to integrate and maintain 
security in the FATA.  Changing the FATA from a semi-autonomous area is essential 
locally in order to improve the socio-economic situation of its inhabitants, regionally for 
the stability of Pakistan and its’ relationship with Afghanistan and India, and globally for 
attempting to deny contested territories from infection by terrorist groups such as Al 
Qaeda.  Understanding the historical context of why the FATA has never fallen under 
control of the ruling government will help in attempting to achieve integration of the 
tribes of the FATA into the Pakistani state.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
Conventional wisdom maintains that integrating the tribes of the FATA 
completely into the writ of the Pakistani government is extremely difficult if not 
impossible.  In contrast, my argument is that no central power has actually tried to 
integrate the FATA into the legal and social framework of the state.  Historically, there 
were very good reasons for the decisions made to leave the tribes of the FATA semi-
autonomous.  The only valuable aspects of the terrain within the FATA are the transit 
routes that allowed access from Central Asia to the Indus River Valley; therefore, the 
tribes in the FATA only needed to cooperate when necessary for various military 
campaigns, trade, and diplomatic missions to avoid the attention of surrounding power 
centers.  When any sustained attempts were made by outside powers or central 
governments to impose authority on tribal land or extract money from the tribes of the 
FATA, they generally faced immediate and violent resistance.  The benefits gained from 
defeating the violent resistance were never worth the effort to the outside power and 
therefore were only half-heartedly attempted if at all.  The resistance from the Pashtun 
                                                 
3 Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, Crisis Group Asia Report No. 178 (Islamabad, Pakistan: 
International Crisis Group. October 21, 2009), i. 
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tribes is frequently attributed to their fiercely independent nature and what Louis Dupree 
describes as an “almost genetically” endowed expertise “at guerrilla warfare” due to 
“centuries of resisting all comers and fighting among themselves when no comers were 
available.”4  This is a simple and incomplete explanation to the complex situation that 
has been playing out in the FATA for the past 117 years.  The attacks of September 11, 
2001 have at least momentarily changed the intrinsic value of the FATA due to the safe 
haven offered transnational terrorists and a growing threat to the Pakistani government.5  
The problem of how to address the frontier is now coming to the fore in domestic, 
regional, and international discussions.  The good news is that if integration is really 
desired it has never really been attempted and therefore, despite popular myth, is not 
impossible. 
The three primary reasons that manpower and resources have not been put forth to 
control the FATA are the way the central government viewed the area with regard to its 
national interests, the geopolitical situations influencing governments to focus their effort 
elsewhere, and the role of Islamist militants in the resistance to any encroachment by the 
central power.  The British viewed the FATA as difficult terrain that added a layer of 
depth to their strategic separation from Russia.  Afghanistan afforded the British a 
diplomatic separation in the form of a nation state, but the FATA added a natural barrier 
that further separated Russia from any ambitions it had toward the more valuable aspects 
of British India.  Pakistan needed the FATA to be a compliant area loyal to the new 
nation initially and later shifted its view toward gaining “strategic depth” vis-à-vis India 
by leveraging the FATA for access to Afghanistan.6  Each of these views were deemed 
best served by leaving the tribes autonomous and manipulating them to the strategic ends 
of the geopolitical context at the time. 
                                                 
4 Louis Dupree, Afghanistan (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), 425. 
 5 Joshua T. White, “Afghanistan and Pakistan: Understanding a Complex Threat Environment,” Brief 
to the United States House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs on March 4, 2009, 2–3. 
6 There is more than one perception on what strategic depth means here.  Generally, the concept is 
primarily focused on allowing Pakistan to focus on India in the event of conflict by maintaining political 
space and leverage to their west with influence over asymmetric assets and potentially increased maneuver 
space. 
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The second reason is tied closely to the first, but is more subject to regional and 
international agendas.  Foreign interests and actions have repeatedly distracted the central 
government and prevented them from making a concerted effort to address the FATA.  
The British did not feel compelled to permanently occupy or integrate the FATA due to 
the geopolitics of two world wars and a retrenching British Empire, combined with the 
relatively successful use of Afghanistan to check Russian and then Soviet advances south 
of the Amu Darya River.  After Partition, Pakistan has been most concerned with a 
persistent conflict with India and ensuring the tribes of the FATA could not be leveraged 
against them by Afghanistan in an attempt to change the disputed Durand Line.  There 
were attempts to improve the social and economic situation in the FATA, but there has 
never been any real move to integrate the tribal lands due to competing interests and 
perceived uses of the frontier. 
The third reason for a reluctance to integrate the FATA has been the role of 
Islamist militants.  Islamist militants presented physical resistance and complicated the 
cultural landscape for both the British and Pakistanis.  Additionally, they came to offer an 
opportunity for manipulation and deniability to the Pakistani government as asymmetric 
threats to their advesaries.  A trend in all of these manifestations of radical Islam is the 
ability of religious figures to work within the Pashtun culture to leverage elements of 
tribal tradition in the pursuit of jihad.  The British faced this resistance from local Sufi 
pirs influenced by exposure to both Deobandi and Wahhabi teachings in the form of 
violent conflicts that erupted any time the Raj encroached too far into the FATA 
physically or culturally.  The general trend for the British was to quell the immediate 
disturbance with overwhelming force, pull back to the settled districts, and reestablish 
allowances to protect the roads across the border.7  The British did not need the FATA 
and did not want to tackle the complexities of a religiously influenced tribal culture that 
they really did not understand.  The British merely desired access to Afghanistan in the 
event they needed to check Russian advances.  Pakistani interaction with religiously 
inspired groups in the FATA has been much more complicated.  Until September 11, 
                                                 
7 Sana Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland (New York, NY: Columbia 
University Press, 2007), 11–13. 
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2001, the Pakistani government worked with and through many of these organizations to 
fight asymmetric battles against the Indians, Soviets, and non-Pashtun groups in 
Afghanistan.  It was viewed as advantageous to leave the FATA autonomous in an effort 
to decrease accountability to the Pakistani state in supporting these organizations seen as 
radical or often terrorists by the international community.  Recently, the organizations 
working from the FATA have developed a much more revolutionary ideology and their 
violence has turned increasingly toward the Pakistani state in the type of resistance faced 
by the British.  These groups now attack the Pakistani state as well as the western forces 
in Afghanistan under the banner of jihad for connected but slightly different reasons.   
Conventional wisdom is that the “disequilibrium” between the social values and 
expectations of the tribes of the FATA and the policies of the central government are too 
divergent to allow integration.8  A closer look at history reveals that in fact controlling 
these tribes has never really been attempted.  Integrating the FATA is now necessary and 
an intelligent, robust effort to assimilate the frontier into the writ of the central 
government must be attempted for the first time. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There has been little interest in looking at a comparative analysis across the 
centuries of how various governments have attempted to consolidate power in the FATA.  
Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema edited a collection of three essays describing the FATA from 
ancient times to post-9/11; however, the essays were not linked in analysis and were 
mostly descriptive in nature.9  There are detailed journalistic accounts of how the 
Pakistani government facilitated jihad in and around the FATA during the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and subsequently supported various personalities during the 
Civil War that followed, which culminated in backing the Taliban.10  However, previous 
to these somewhat critical analyses of contemporary policies toward the border area, 
                                                 
8 Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982), 73. 
9 Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, ed., Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan (Islamabad: Islamabad 
Policy Research Institute, 2005).  
10 I am specifically referring to Ghost Wars by Steve Coll and Taliban by Ahmed Rashid here.  
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other accounts of the Afghan Kings, British, and Pakistani governments tell a story of 
how events happened more than addressing why government attempts to gain influence 
in the FATA succeeded or failed and to what extent they were really pursued.  This paper 
attempts to bridge this gap by comparing past attempts to influence the tribes of the 
FATA to see what can be learned.  
The same gap is present in looking at the effects of radical religious leaders in the 
FATA.  Sana Haroon presents an in depth look at the influence of Islamic leaders in the 
frontier from the late 1800s through Partition and David Edwards adds specific case 
studies to our knowledge of how these religious leaders interacted with Pashtun culture.  
Both authors use an impressive amount of primary source documents to support their 
research in giving these accounts of the depth of religious influence on the frontier.  
Numerous authors, including Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, have picked up the 
mantle in the wake of the Soviet Invasion and subsequent actions of the Taliban, but they 
often leave unstated the existence of radical Islam in the frontier dating back to the late 
1800’s.  Linking these studies can show the fundamental change that has occurred in the 
scope of radical Islamist influence in the FATA and help point out the necessity for the 
Pakistani state to curb the current form that is exerting increasing power through 
persistent force. 
In order to fill the gap in the literature, a thorough understanding of the frontier 
and acknowledgement that the FATA is a challenge is necessary.  Max Weber defines the 
state as holding “the monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force” in a given 
territory.11  The region now known as the FATA is relatively unique in comparative 
politics because no state or tribe has held a monopoly in these Pashtun lands.  Weber 
furthers his definition of legitimacy in regards to the domination of a territory or people 
as deriving from a legal, traditional, or charismatic mandate.12  Local legitimacy in the 
FATA historically derives from tribal tradition and occasionally from a charismatic 
                                                 
11 Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” Essential Readings in Comparative Politics, 2nd Ed., ed. 
Patrick H. O’Neil and Ronald Rogowski (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2006), 32. 
12 Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” 32. 
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religious figure, but never from a legal mandate.13  Any legitimate governing structure 
must work through the Pashtun to integrate a semblance of legality.  
In order to investigate the FATA, a detailed knowledge of the Pashtun ethno-
linguistic group is necessary as well.  Since the FATA was not annexed by the British 
until the establishment of the Durand Line in 1893, the general regions dominated by the 
tribes that have historically inhabited the hills and mountains of the Hindu Kush and 
Sulaiman ranges west of the Indus River must be referenced in relation to the Afghan 
Kings prior to the end of the nineteenth century.14  It is difficult to find an inclusive 
history because the Pashtuns inhabiting these territories never built monuments or 
documented their existence due to the memory-based nature of their society.  The fact 
that the “various empires which claimed in the past to rule this Frontier really only 
extended to control over the plains and one or two of the passages through the 
mountains” creates a situation where the only history of a people is documented by 
invaders and anthropologists.15  Historians of the FATA are constrained by information 
documented by transients and not inhabitants until very recently.  Anthropologists on the 
other hand, although immersing themselves in society, fall victim to what Akbar S. 
Ahmed calls a ‘narcissistic ethnic study’ where the researcher in an area like the FATA 
falls in love with the culture on which he depends for existence and often documents a 
poetic admiration without acknowledging all of the shortcomings.16  Despite these 
problems and biases, some themes begin to occur in the manner in which governments 
have addressed the FATA. 
Dupree’s Afghanistan gives a detailed descriptive history of the Afghan Kings 
that includes interaction with the British over the FATA.  David Edwards and Sana 
                                                 
13 Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 15. 
14 The Durand Line was the first time a border was established between the British Raj and 
Afghanistan.  Amir Abdurrahman Khan agreed to the boundary after two months of negotiations with Sir 
Mortimer Durand.  After the Partition of India in 1947, Afghanistan disputed the border as invalid, but the 
tribes in the FATA have never really acknowledged it anyway. 
15 Caroe, The Pathans, xxiii. 
16 Akbar S. Ahmed, Resistance and Control in Pakistan: Revised Edition (New York, NY: Rutledge, 
2004), 135. 
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Haroon expand on this history, as well as their contributions to the religious aspect 
mentioned earlier, to show how the tribes in the FATA interacted with the British 
government in India and the Afghan Kings as they struggled for influence in the frontier.  
These exhaustive accounts as well as Olaf Caroe’s anthropological look at the Pashtuns 
of the greater border region are integral in analyzing the methods used by the Afghan 
Kings in Kabul and Kandahar to affect the tribes of the FATA during British rule.  A 
trend of brutal punishment alternating with excessive payoffs and avoidance as well as 
utilization for addressing external threats emerges from these histories.  Understanding of 
these trends is aided by an understanding of Pashtunwali or “the way of the Pashtun.”  
Thomas Johnson and Chris Mason contribute helpful insight into the many subtleties of 
this ancient tribal code, but a more current look at the tribal situation in the turmoil of the 
FATA may be necessary to see if the code can still be leveraged or if that is even 
desirable. 
The descriptive nature of literature concerning the FATA continued with the 
histories of Partition.  Although volumes have been written about Pakistani policy with 
regard to its relationship with India, the story of how Pakistan chose to mimic British 
policy in the frontier generally appears as merely a section of a chapter in books 
describing the creation of the Pakistani state written in the 1960s.17  The conventional 
wisdom in British and Partition era accounts of the FATA present the failure to integrate 
the tribes into the writ of the central government as a matter of the cost being too high.  A 
closer read of the events prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979 paints a clearer picture of 
the central government as having a lack of interest in integration due to competing 
geopolitical concerns and an aversion to addressing a complicated religious and tribal 
culture.  Current events now demand the Pakistani state takes action. 
Joshua White, Akbar Ahmed, and Ahmed Rashid provide solid commentary and 
reasonable solutions on the current situation in the FATA and methods in which to 
address the anarchy that now exists.  These analysts rightly disdain the antiquated 
methods that have persisted in administering the tribal areas and agree with many think 
                                                 
17 I am specifically referring to Wayne Wilcox’s Pakistan: The Consolidation of a Nation and L.F. 
Rushbrook Williams’ The State of Pakistan. 
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tanks proclaiming that change is necessary and long past due.  Yet despite the breadth of 
knowledge available, it appears that the obvious has gone unsaid in that no government 
has ever really tried to fix the problem by bringing the tribes of the FATA to heel due to 
competing interests.  The geopolitical context and compounding effects created by radical 
Islamists are valid reasons that governments have not put for the effort to control the 
FATA.  In order to curb the myth that integration of the FATA is too hard or not 
desirable for Pakistan, this study seeks to fill the gap in analysis to highlight why the 
attempt has not been made as growing international, regional, and local pressures now 
necessitate action to assimilate the tribes of the FATA into Pakistani society. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In attempting to answer the question of why the FATA has never been integrated 
into the central government, I will examine the British and Pakistani approaches to 
dealing with the tribes of the frontier region.  Specifically, I will conduct a historical 
study of the attempts at control or pacification taken by the British from 1893 through 
their Modified Forward Policy following the Third Anglo-Afghan War.  Additionally, I 
will analyze four time periods of Pakistani governance to highlight different approaches 
and concerns that have developed following Partition.  I have chosen to begin the study 
with the establishment of the Durand Line due to the ongoing disputation of this 
international border.  In doing so, I will not be capturing many historic trends faced by 
numerous invaders before the British and Pakistani state, but will be able to focus my 
research on a history of the current defined boundaries of the FATA.  The history prior to 
1893 is important to the Pashtun narrative, but can accurately be captured by similar 
trends that appear in the British and Pakistani studies.  The key considerations for each 
case are the manner in which the central government viewed the FATA relative to their 
national interest, the effects of the geopolitical context on addressing the FATA as well 
as the role of radical religion in preventing or resisting integration into the social and 
political mainstream by the tribes of the FATA.  In analyzing these three facets of the 
problem, I will consider the level of control and at times compliance of the tribes of the 
FATA into the influence of the central government.  There are no success stories to be 
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found here, but an analysis of the degree of failure and what reasons led to and sustained 
the separation from the construct of the state are important.  This should not be confused 
with selecting cases to support my argument, but is merely a reflection of the samples 
available, which is precisely why this question is important. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
After giving an introduction to the terrain, people, and social structures of the 
FATA, I intend to organize my analysis into three sections.  The first will look at the 
British approach to governing the FATA, from the creation of the Durand Line and how 
that came about in 1893 until their transition to the Modified Forward Policy, through the 
lens of the geopolitical context of British interests in greater India.   In this chapter, I will 
also highlight how radical religion in the FATA was a catalyst to resistance of British 
penetration during the same time frame and how this resistance shaped British policy 
with regard to the Durand Line.  The second section will pick up with the Pakistani 
methods of administering the FATA and chronicle the geopolitical context at play 
immediately following the Partition of India, after the 1971 war with India during 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto’s administration, and during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan 
and subsequent rise of the Taliban.  This chapter is intended to show how regional and 
international interests created a situation where Pakistan lost some initial momentum to 
improve the social and economic situation in the FATA and the downward spiral in 
losing control of radical elements the state helped to create.  Throughout the chapter, I 
will describe the role these radical religious organizations played in serving Pakistan’s 
interests and how they have changed over time to threaten Pakistan’s existence.  The last 
chapter will summarize why integration of the FATA has not been attempted and link the 
analysis of why this is so in order to further the discussion of how integration should be 
accomplished.  Additionally, I will give an update on the current situation following 
September 11, 2001 and briefly describe how I think Pakistan can integrate the FATA 
into the writ of the central government or at a minimum explain why it must. 
I have chosen to organize the thesis chronologically and by attempting to isolate 
the key variables at play in order to highlight what has prevented these governments from 
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really attempting to integrate the FATA into the state.  My logic in organizing the thesis 
in this manner is to show that marginalizing the FATA in the interest of greater national 
goals or interests is nothing new.  Additionally, illustrating how domestic, regional, and 
international actors have made similar mistakes that have culminated in the violent 
situation currently seen in the region may avoid exacerbating the problem as we move 
forward.  If integrating and controlling the FATA were easy, it would have been done; 
however, in analyzing the history, I intend to show three key reasons why integration and 
control have never really been attempted.  Figure 1 is provided as a reference for the 
argument that follows in subsequent chapters. 
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Figure 1.   Reasons for decisions not to integrate the FATA 
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II. THE FATA AND THE PASHTUN 
 In order to understand the FATA, a description of the terrain that has shaped 
generations of the Pashtun inhabiting the land is necessary.  The severe terrain of the 
FATA contributes to the Pashtun tribes maintaining a flattened tribal structure that 
traditionally reinforced a very localized social order.  Within this social order, the 
Pashtunwali code maintained a governing framework for interaction within and between 
a society of warrior tribes.  The perceived and real independent nature of the Pashtun 
derives from the history of the land and the peoples’ interaction with the numerous 
transient empires that passed through.  This perception is part of the conventional wisdom 
of why the Pashtun of the FATA have never been conquered.  The perception of 
independence must be understood, but falls short of explaining the lack of integration into 
a central government. 
 A discussion of the geography and Pashtun tradition is critical to place in context 
some of the challenges faced by the British and then the Pakistani government when 
addressing the FATA.  Many of these challenges have been amplified by history simply 
because the British and Pakistani government chose not to confront them in deference to 
higher geopolitical priorities elsewhere in their empire or on their eastern border in the 
case of Pakistan.  The following discussion sets the stage for understanding that can 
guide a framework for integration in the years ahead. 
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Figure 2.   Map of the FATA 
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A. TERRAIN AND PEOPLE 
Caroe stated that geographically the Pashtun country was difficult to describe, but 
is best thought of “as a long narrow fortification running parallel in two belts, first a moat 
and then a rampart, along the line of the Indus.”18  The rampart that Caroe describes 
running from Pakistan’s northwestern Himalaya zone southwest to the Sulaiman 
Mountains is roughly the FATA.  The moat, or the Indus River, provided irrigation to the 
plains between the fingers of the mountains stretching to meet the Indus.  These areas, 
including the Peshawar plain, proved valuable for farming and therefore were settled and 
integrated into first British, then Pakistani society.  The rugged hills and mountains, 
reaching 16,000 feet in places, were of little value with the exception of various crossing 
points that accessed either Central Asia or the Indian subcontinent.  The FATA is 
naturally an uninviting place that is either freezing or sweltering depending on the season 
and has nothing really to offer a governing power other than a few transit routes.  These 
strictly environmental reasons contributed to the rulers of the many empires attempting 
dominion in Delhi and Kabul to really only extend their “control over the plains and one 
or two of the passages through the mountains.”19  Notably even control of the passes was 
subsidized by paying for security from the tribes. 
There is a distinction made among the Pashtun between those that inhabit the 
plains and those that inhabit the mountains.  Caroe stated that those that inhabit the plains 
“have always been regarded as the senior branch of the race” mostly because of their 
interaction with occupying empires or occasional rule over the areas of modern day 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of India.20  The “highlanders,” including the Afridis, 
Orakzais, Waziris, and Mehsuds, on the other hand, are the “tribes who never fell under 
the effective sway of any recorded imperial authority and now form the backbone of the 
so-called tribal belt.”21  The uncompromising nature of the mountain Pashtun and the  
 
                                                 
18 Caroe, The Pathans, xix. 
19 Caroe, The Pathans, xxiii. 
20 Caroe, The Pathans, xvi. 
21 Caroe, The Pathans, xvii. 
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plains Pashtun generally under greater government control are best summed up by the 
Pashtun proverb that describes the Pashtun self-conception in stating, “honor ate up the 
mountains; taxes ate up the plains.”22   
The terrain of the highlanders, the FATA, enhances the flattened tribal structure 
of the Pashtun.  A flat tribal structure means each individual and each tribe are seen as 
equal and therefore negotiation must be held sometimes with literally every village in 
order to accomplish diplomacy in the FATA.23  It is easy to comprehend why the 
geographically isolated nature of the villages and a nomadic history would drive tribes to 
want to speak for themselves and their unique situation.  In general terms, each Pashtun 
tribe breaks down from the larger tribal group to the nuclear family, but the best 
description of how to think of the individual Pashtun’s allegiances comes from M. Jamil 
Hanifi as quoted from Johnson: 
The Afghan individual is surrounded . . . by concentric rings consisting of 
family, extended family, clan, tribe, confederacy, and major cultural-
linguistic group.  The hierarchy of loyalties corresponds to these circles 
and becomes more intense as the circle gets smaller . . . in case of crisis, 
his recourse is to the kinship and, if necessary, the larger cultural group.  
National feelings and loyalties are filtered through the successive layers.24 
B. TRADITIONAL SOCIAL ORDER 
The role of the khans, the maliks, and the mullahs are critical to an understanding 
of the Pashtun decision-making process.  The positions of khan and malik are traditional 
leadership roles within the Pashtun tribes of the FATA.  The khan of a clan is responsible 
for ensuring the well-being of the village based on his accumulated wealth, wives, proven 
valor in battle, and sons.25  When visitors are taken in as guests, the khan often works 
                                                 
22 Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the 
International System (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 28. 
23 Some tribal structures are a hierarchy where one elder can make decisions for an entire group. 
Anyone trying to work with Pashtun tribes usually has difficulty in negotiations due to the consensus 
required to come to a decision due to the flattened structure of the Pashtun, especially in the FATA. 
24 Thomas Johnson and Chris M. Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire” (International Security 32, 
no. 4, Spring 2008), 51–53. 
 25 Johnson and Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire,” 62. 
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with the mullah to ensure proper hospitality is rendered during their stay with the clan in 
the hujra or traditional area used as a male social center.  The malik is a popularly 
selected spokesman for the clan that is respected and listened to during council and in 
village affairs, but like the khan cannot give orders to anyone not in his immediate 
family.  The position of malik is sometimes hereditary and often is the first to speak to 
intruders whether they are from other tribes or the British or Pakistani Political Agents.26  
Since Pashtun tribal society is flat rather than hierarchical, decisions that had to result in 
an order to a clan member or decision outside the immediate family had to be discussed 
at a jirga. 
A jirga, or tribal council, can take place in the form of an entire tribe for major 
matters or at the sub-tribe or clan level for matters of lesser importance.  The jirga 
consists of the khan, malik, other tribal elders, and as many of the younger warriors and 
members as may be present meeting and listening to all opinions concerning the matter 
requiring a decision.  Smaller jirgas can be conducted over legal matters and offenses 
within a village to keep disputes from becoming larger.  Larger tribal jirgas can concern 
war with another tribe or foreign intruder over major grievances.  The critical aspects of 
the jirga are that everything takes place in the open and the final decision is adhered to by 
the entire group concerned.27  If a jirga is convened to discuss going to war, it would also 
generally appoint the military commander who will lead and give orders to other 
members of the clan for a limited time during fighting.  The fighting group is called a 
lashkar.  Therefore, generally the largest militant unit in the FATA was the males of a 
clan and they would usually only fight to defend up to their tribal boundaries.28  The 
mullah generally played a small role in tribal jirgas as the decisions were based on 
traditional “laws” of Pashtunwali and not religious rulings based on Sharia.29 
The mullah’s role was at the mosque, which became the place for exchanging 
information, rumors, stories, and gossip as well as leading daily and weekly prayers to 
                                                 
26 Johnson and Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire,” 62. 
27 Caroe, The Pathans, 411. 
28 Johnson and Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire,” 63. 
29 A discussion of Pasthunwali, the Pashtun tribal code, follows in the next section. 
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support the village.  The mullah was generally one of the few literate people in the village 
or clan and therefore could shape the message delivered from the Quran as well as relate 
news events from distant regions if a newspaper was acquired from a traveler or during 
the mullah’s travels.  The thoughts, gossip, and rumor expressed by the mullah carried 
the same weight as substantiated fact due to the insular nature of tribal society.  Each 
village did not have its own mullah due to the terrain and proximity to urban religious 
centers of learning; therefore, FATA mullahs often represented more than one clan or 
tribe.30  Haroon notes that “tensions created by geographic proximity coupled with social 
and economic confinement gave rise to a complex system of inter-village and inter-tribal 
relationships marked by intense competitions between clans, even those of the same 
lineage, which often turned violent and sparked blood feuds that could go on for 
generations.”31  Often the only acceptable arbitrator that could stop bloodshed and reach 
a compromise in these disputes was the mullah.32  Due to the respect afforded Islam in 
the tribal areas, mullahs were some of the few individuals that could travel freely and for 
this reason came in touch with more of the surrounding world than the clans.  These 
contacts included other religious leaders, various parts of Afghanistan, ruling parties in 
India under the British, and later Pakistani officials.  The Afghans and British would 
attempt to leverage the mullahs in frontier areas where the maliks could not be purchased 
in order to gain access to the passes through the Hindu Kush and attempt to placate the 
more hostile tribes.  However, during times of crisis, when greater tribal independence 
was challenged, when foreigners attempted to occupy large tracts of land, or when tribes 
were not appropriately compensated for use of land, the mullahs would rise outside the 
normal tribal arrangements and lead a coalition of tribes to war.  War did not always 
come in the form of jihad, but always involved a charismatic mullah who could inspire 
multiple clans or tribes to follow his banner outside of tribal boundaries for a persuasive 
purpose.  
                                                 
30 Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, 70–74. 
31 Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, 76. 
32 Haroon, Frontier of Faith: Islam in the Indo-Afghan Borderland, 76. 
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C. PASHTUNWALI 
Permeating the tribal structure and social order is Pashtunwali, which is literally 
the way of the Pashtun or more precisely a code of honor or sort of unwritten constitution 
guiding Pashtun life.  Pashtunwali stresses the personal values of independence, honor, 
revenge, and hospitality.  The Pashtun pride themselves on social equality and among the 
males cannot be ordered by another Pashtun without a collective decision being reached.  
Johnson points out that the result of the extended family taking responsibility for the 
actions of individuals’ results in this male independence being “more about freedom from 
being ordered what to do than freedom to do what he pleases.”33  In actuality, 
Pashtunwali demands independence, while constraining this freedom with the other three 
personal values that dictate action. 
The most important duty of a Pashtun male is to uphold his honor or nang.  
Defending his nang requires the defense and control of his zan, zar, and zamin (women, 
gold, and land), which are collectively known as namus.  Zamin is a flexible concept that 
can be individual land holdings or tribal boundaries depending on the context.34  The 
importance of nang is best summarized in the worst derogatory term for another Pashtun, 
which is dauz or literally “a person with no honor.”35  The requirement for a Pashtun to 
defend his honor often results in his requirement to seek revenge.  Revenge or badal is 
required when a Pashtun has been wronged and action to correct the situation is required 
regardless of the consequences.  Badal often spirals into intra-clan and inter-clan 
conflicts that can last for years and take the form of blood feuds unless a solution can be 
mediated through a jirga to end hostilities.36 
Hospitality in Pashtunwali is embodied in the concepts of nanawatey meaning 
begging for pardon or protection and melmastia meaning unconditional hospitality and 
                                                 
33 Johnson and Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire,” 62.  
34 Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International 
System, 24. 
35 Johnson and Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire,” 59. 
36 Shinwari, Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan’s 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 21. 
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protection even to enemies.  Nanawatey is usually conducted by an offending party and 
involves going to the clan of the wronged family and asking for forgiveness at the 
victim’s mercy.  This action often includes bringing gifts to show sincerity for the 
offense.  Melmastia is the greatest obligation under Pashtunwali and requires giving 
shelter and protection to those on the owners land.  The hospitality inherent in these two 
concepts is linked to revenge in the host not wanting to bring hostility to his land.37  Both 
of these concepts were leveraged by the Afghan Taliban and Al Qaeda elements fleeing 
Afghanistan to the FATA in the wake of the U.S. and NATO invasion in 2001. 
The Pashtunwali code provides social norms that cherish independence while 
constraining that freedom with tribal mandates for action in certain situations.  I disagree 
with Thomas Johnson’s assertion that Pashtunwali is not an “absence of governance, nor 
summary judgment, nor a lynch mob at work” due to the violent manifestations of the 
anachronistic social norms involved with the justice administered.  However, I do agree 
with his opinion that Pashtunwali is “an alternative form of social organization with an 
advanced conflict resolution mechanism.”38  The problem in the FATA is that the system 
is now broken due to the influx of refugees, terrorists, and insurgents that have changed 
some of the very social organization that made the Pashtun who they are.  The constant 
conflict inherent with the concept of badal and the Pashtun narrative of extreme 
independence have played into the myth of the impossibility of integrating the FATA due 
to the complexity of the culture.  The shift in social organization brought on by 33 years 
of Islamist militancy has now deemed irrelevant any truth to this narrative due to the 
threat posed to Pakistan from the FATA. 
D. SUMMARY 
The social structure and the terrain of the FATA made the tribes “living between 
the Kabul and Gomal rivers . . . harder to control on account of their intensely democratic 
                                                 
37 Shinwari, Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan’s 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 20. 
38 Johnson and Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire,” 61. 
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organization.”39  The organization is democratic due to each individual rating an opinion 
at a tribal council, but real change was never possible due to the constraints of tribal 
traditions.  The difficulty in control stems from the independent nature of each tribe and 
their resistance to rule from any other.  The Pashtun claim of never being subjects only 
emboldens their independence and desire to remain autonomous; however, this 
independence can lead to an overestimation of their strength and allows myths to 
reinforce some sort of “historical determinism.”40 The determination was less a product 
of Pashtun independence and more a product of central powers making a decision to 
leave the FATA autonomous in view of how their national interests were prioritized. 
The fact is foreign invaders did not occupy these regions because there was 
nothing attractive about the “wilderness, harsh climate and lack of resources” in the 
FATA, so they bypassed the hills and moved on to “greener pastures” which were a 
higher priority.41  The terrain has allowed and reinforced Pashtun independence.  The 
autonomy enjoyed by the tribes was a minor concern that had to be addressed by the 
British and Pakistan in the form of minor military engagements and political concessions 
in order to protect what was important to their governments and focus on bigger issues.  
The FATA is no longer a minor concern due to local irredentist goals, regional instability 
caused by persistent violence, and the threat of international terrorism that continually 
originates from these borderlands.  Before addressing the present situation, much can be 
learned from the British and Pakistani experiences in placating the tribes of the FATA 
while attempting to manage what was important to their respective empire or 
government.  
The next chapter argues that the British allowed the FATA to remain a semi-
autonomous area for three main reasons.  First, the British were not concerned with land 
that was relatively void of fertile ground or natural resources.  Second, geopolitically, 
they were primarily worried about Russian encroachment on the Indus River Valley and 
                                                 
39 Shinwari, Understanding FATA: Attitudes Towards Governance, Religion & Society in Pakistan’s 
Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 12. 
40 Cheema, ed., Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 65.  
41 Cheema, ed., Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, 64.  
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the best means to achieve security in the Northwest portions of British India.  Third, the 
small, yet frequent, violent uprisings generated by religious zealots created a complex 
cultural situation in the FATA that the British chose not to integrate into the more 
controllable population in and east of the Indus River Valley.  
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III. THE BRITISH AND THE FATA  
Great Britain became increasingly influential on the Indian Subcontinent’s 
periphery throughout the eighteenth century due to their naval dominance and trade 
interests, especially in Bengal.  As long as profits were high and taxes virtually 
nonexistent, the John Company Raj was willing to leave the interior of India to the 
Mughals, Afghans, Marathas, and Sikhs.  European competition for global influence 
changed Britain’s view of the subcontinent.  After 1828, the Raj began to look west as 
Russia penetrated deeper into Persia to compete with the British for influence there.  
British fear of the “creeping bear” drove exploration of the Indus River out of a belief 
that eventually Russia would have to be fought somewhere on the Frontier.  Between 
1843 and 1849, the British fought their way up the Indus to capture and then control first 
Sind and then Punjab.  Britain saw extending its territory to the Indus as “manifest 
destiny” in the desire to expand commercial markets and leverage the land for greater 
profit.42  The result was 100,000 square miles of “India’s most fertile soil, destined to 
become the breadbasket of the British Empire,” annexed along the Indus.43 Notably, 
Kashmir, with a majority Muslim population, was given to Hindu rulers at this time by 
the British, which continues to be a key obstacle to regional stability today.  Once the 
Indus and the fruits that derived from its water were attained, only Russia could incite the 
British to seek any more than a stalemate in the Frontier as part of the drama played out 
in what is called the Great Game.44   
Russia and later the Soviet Union never really did this; therefore, Britain 
conducted enough punitive military expeditions and established adequate control 
mechanisms to protect their interests on the subcontinent without exerting the effort to 
integrate the FATA because they did not want or need to take this action.  The British 
                                                 
42 Stanley Wolpert, A New History of India, Eighth ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 
230. 
43 Wolpert, A New History of India, 230. 
44 The “Great Game” is a common term used to describe the contest between the British and Russian 
empires for influence in Southwest Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East primarily during the nineteenth 
century. 
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early on discovered that the terrain and people of Afghanistan and the frontier were a 
complicated problem that would be difficult and expensive to control if conquered.  Their 
primary concern was having enough influence in Kabul to resist Russian encroachment 
and access to the interior of Afghanistan should they need to counter a Russian advance 
toward India.  The history of the British in the frontier is a constant search to find a 
balance of peace with the tribes west of the Indus while maintaining influence in 
Afghanistan with the perception of strength in the form of watch and ward in the frontier.  
The FATA was only valuable as a fence with gates that could be opened to the west when 
and if the British needed to advance in that direction. 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the challenges faced by the British in 
securing the settled areas along the Indus River valley, while balancing how far west to 
establish their presence in order to influence the Afghans and be ready to counter Russian 
political and military maneuvers.  The establishment of the international boundary 
between British India and Afghanistan and the methods developed for administering the 
FATA will be discussed as well as the resistance from religiously inspired tribal groups at 
different times during British occupation.  The history of jihad in the FATA is ancient 
and the British experience with the “mad mullahs” contributed to their decision to avoid 
the complexities involved with conquering the frontier.45  The origins of militancy nested 
in religious rhetoric during British rule have caused recent manifestations to see 
themselves as successors to a tradition of jihad and understanding the causes and history 
of the resistance can help point to a solution to a violent social trend. 
A. ESTABLISHMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE FATA 
Although the Pashtun narrative and the history of Britain in India are important to 
the context of controversy on the frontier, a discussion of the FATA must begin with the 
agreement between Afghanistan and Britain over the Durand Line.  The Durand Line was 
not defined as the boundary of India, although in fact it became one, but instead a line 
over which neither the Afghans nor the British would interfere with the others interests.  
                                                 
45 “Mad mullahs” is a common term to describe the perceived fanatical religious leaders that the 
British frequently encountered during uprisings along the frontier. 
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The British did not want the line to be a boundary because they “did not intend to absorb 
the tribes into their administrative system, only to extend their own, and exclude the 
Amir’s, authority in the territory east and south of the line.”46  The Durand Line really 
established a tribal belt to the west of the settled districts that created “a buffer to a 
buffer” and did not at all have the rigidity associated with other international 
boundaries.47 
Figure 3.   Representation of the Great Game 
                                                 
46 Caroe, The Pathans, 382. 
47 Dupree, Afghanistan, 427.  The first buffer here is the buffer Afghanistan provided between Britain 
and Russia. 
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1. The Durand Line 
Prior to 1893, the British had fought two wars with the Afghans and transitioned 
from a Close Border Policy to a Forward Policy due to Russian encroachment from the 
north.  Following their humiliating defeat in 1842, which concluded the First Anglo-
Afghan War, and during the two wars with the Sikhs later in the same decade, the British 
realized that the job of controlling the tribal areas of their western frontier and 
Afghanistan was beyond their capabilities in India at the time.  Therefore, the Close 
Border Policy sought to avoid aggression on tribal territory and not interfere with tribal 
affairs including paying subsidies and allowances to the tribes to maintain peace and 
order.  The paramilitary Punjab Frontier Force, later to become the Frontier Corps as part 
of the Indian Army, was formed during this time to help close the border.  After the 
conquest of Sindh and the Punjab, and with increasing British resources, the Forward 
Policy was undertaken in response to the Russian armies pushing closer to the borders of 
Afghanistan.  The Forward Policy essentially called for a strategic line of defense against 
Russian advances in Central Asia, which included increasing the British sphere of 
influence in Afghanistan.  In 1878, when the Afghan King refused to allow a British 
envoy into Kabul, the British Viceroy, Lord Lytton declared war on Afghanistan.  The 
war resulted in a permanent advance and continued control of the Khyber Pass and 
eventually Amir Abdur Rahman Khan on the Afghan thrown with help and approval 
from the British.48 
The Durand Line was established during a mission to Kabul between Abdur 
Rahman and Sir Mortimer Durand, the British Indian Foreign Secretary, in November of 
1893.  Prior to this mission, the British had already had a hand in negotiating the western 
and northern boundaries of Afghanistan to create a buffer between British India and 
Russia’s ambitions.  Before the Amir requested this meeting with the British to discuss 
the southern and eastern boundary, he had been on a mission of “internal imperialism” by 
attempting to put in order the “hundreds of petty chiefs, plunderers, robbers, and cut 
                                                 
48 Noor-ul Haq, “Northwest Tribal Belt of Pakistan” (Federally Administered Tribal Areas of 
Pakistan, ed. Dr Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema. Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2005), 14–15. 
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throats,” which included the tribes in the FATA, by “breaking down the feudal and tribal 
system and substituting one grand community under one law and one rule.”49  From the 
British perspective, the Durand Line was a compromise between two competing theories.  
The “backward group” argued for a boundary along the Indus River due to the expense 
and effort required in occupying the mountains to the west.  The “forward group” 
countered with a border running roughly from Kabul through Gazni to Kandahar to 
enhance India’s security.50  Abdur Rahman wanted to rid himself of the incessant tribal 
revolts in the frontier area and free himself from the worry of British road and railway 
construction that were oriented through the passes at Kabul and Kandahar and were 
“pushing like a knife into” his “vitals.”51  The result was roughly what the international 
boundary is today with a majority of the eastern Pashtun hill tribes falling on the British 
side of the border.  Britain also retained the right to speak for Afghanistan in foreign 
affairs.  With the exception of relinquishing his right to foreign policy, Abdur Rahman 
appears to have gotten most of what he desired geographically even though he gave fair 
warning about the tribes of Waziristan specifically when telling Durand: 
If (the frontier tribes) were included in my dominions I should be able to 
make them fight against any enemy of England and myself, by the name 
of a religious war, under the flag of their co-religious Muslim ruler . . . I 
will gradually make them peaceful subjects and good friends of Great 
Britain.  But if you cut them out of my dominions, they will neither be of 
any use to you nor to me.52 
The boundary ostensibly determined between Afghanistan and British India, the British 
could continue setting up their administration and accomplishing their goals in the 
frontier. 
                                                 
49 Dupree, Afghanistan, 417, 419. 
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2. Defining and “Ruling” the Tribal Areas 
Lieutenant Winston Churchill metaphorically viewed “the most natural way of 
preventing an enemy from entering a house is to hold the door and windows; and the 
general consensus of opinion is that to secure India it is necessary to hold the passes of 
the mountains.”53  Haroon more specifically stated that the British had two goals in the 
frontier.  She asserts the preparation of the highlands for potential mobilization and the 
complicity and involvement of the tribes as facilitators of British policy and not 
antagonists to it are what drove the British to their methods in attempting to exert 
influence in the frontier region.54 In order to accomplish these goals, Britain had to figure 
out how to pacify and influence the tribes.  In 1876, the British signed an agreement with 
the Khan of Kalat that gained them access to the Bolan Pass and basing in Quetta through 
a lease.  Robert Groves Sandeman, the first Agent to the Governor-General of 
Balochistan, arranged what is now known as the Sandeman system to successfully 
administer and control Balochistan.  Sandeman essentially paid large subsidies to the 
tribal leaders to maintain peace and order through their Khassadar Regiments.55  
Khassadars were Balochi tribesman loyal to their tribal leader who was ultimately loyal 
to the Khan of Kalat and therefore accountability could ultimately rest with one man.  
The hierarchical nature of the Baloch tribal system allowed the Sandeman system to 
work.  The flattened tribal structure of the Pashtun would make a similar system 
untenable in the FATA.  The British came to understand that administration and 
pacification in the Pashtun frontier was not as easy in large part for this reason. 
In 1877, Lord Lytton realized the tribal areas in the frontier that would become 
the FATA were too dispersed to be defended by the available British forces and would 
have to be managed politically.  At the time, the British government of the Punjab 
Province was responsible for administering the five settled districts of Peshawar, Kohat, 
Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, and Dera Ghazi Khan and accomplished this through 
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appointed Deputy Commissioners.  Political Agents were appointed as counterparts to the 
Deputy Commissioners and were required to liaise with the tribes of the tribal agencies 
adjacent to the settled districts.  The Political Agents were to recruit tribal militias and 
levies to police the area, establish peace, and build outposts where the militias were 
intended to garrison.56  The Political Agents soon realized that in order to liaise with the 
tribes they needed to further define the locations and composition of the numerous clan 
affiliations in their agencies.  Therefore, the military and political departments produced 
survey reports with topographical descriptions of land and tribal tables as they went about 
loosely mapping the Durand Line in 1893.  The British used this data to further define the 
agencies and map out what tribes were responsible for what areas in the frontier.  The 
problem was that these tribal boundaries shifted as conflict among the tribes and clans 
constantly changed the amount of land and power held by any one tribe.  Therefore, the 
process of creating agencies was a depiction of pre-existing political landscapes that the 
administrative processes of cartography could not keep up with as political space was 
redefined among the tribes.57 
The difficulties in politically influencing the tribes would become more apparent 
over the next 50 years, but the British forged ahead with creating defined borders and 
rules to govern the frontier that they little understood.  The Khyber and Kurram agencies 
were actually created before the Durand Line in 1879 and 1892 respectively as a means 
to control the passes to Afghanistan; however, influence was primarily concerned with 
these routes and not overall stability in the region.  In 1895, the North and South 
Waziristan Agencies as well as the Malakand Agency were established which stretched 
the defined borders of the tribes from Dir to Balochistan.58  The British were allowed to 
maintain a presence in the tribal areas by paying increasing allowances to the tribes for 
the militias as stated previously.  In 1901 two significant administrative changes 
occurred.  First the NWFP was established to include the settled districts but not Dir, 
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Chitral, and Swat or the tribal areas.  The intent was to further integrate the Pashtun of 
the lowlands and their natural resources while attempting to keep the Pashtuns from the 
hilly frontier from plundering settled British territory.  The Political Agents still reported 
to the central government in the Punjab and sought gradual pacification of the tribes.  
Additionally, the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR), which had been in existence 
previously, were formalized as the method for the Political Agents to administer justice in 
the FATA. 
The FCR allowed the tribes to refer crimes to jirgas and empowered the Political 
Agents with the right to enforce collective punishments designed to force tribes to police 
unruly individuals or elements themselves.  The jirga was used in an attempt to nest 
British influence within tribal tradition.  Under the FCR, the Political Agent acting as a 
District Magistrate convenes a jirga with the assent of the tribal elders and the accused to 
determine the guilt or innocence with regards to a crime.  Generally, the Political Agent 
agreed with the recommendations of the jirga in an attempt to allow the tribes to enforce 
their laws based on their customs.  However, the Political Agent could disagree with the 
ruling and chose to appoint another jirga.59  The collective punishments allowed were in 
keeping with Pashtun tradition and were an effective mechanism for the British to 
attempt to enforce a judicial system in the FATA.  That being said, the FCR imposed by 
the British would not have been tolerated without the allowances paid to the tribal elders.  
The key to British influence and administration as well as the cause of much of 
the unrest in the FATA was the appointment of maliks to serve as the spokesperson for a 
tribe.  Usually the British accepted the tribe’s appointed spokesman, but occasionally had 
to find someone they could work with.  The Political Agents paid the allowances to the 
maliks to be distributed proportionally to the clans based on their contribution to the 
militias and levies protecting the lines of communication, building the rudimentary 
infrastructure, and keeping the peace.  The British also paid the maliks a special 
compensation for their duties, which went against the equality normally accepted in 
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Pashtun tradition.60  The misunderstanding of the tribal dynamic involved when maliks 
were elevated above the equality demanded by Pashtunwali combined with the 
corruption of the maliks in taking care of those closest to their clan first were an 
understandable result of the complexity of the Pashtun tribes in the FATA.  Regardless, 
the cause of much of the tribal unrest was the impression of favoritism among the tribes 
or the encroachment of the British agenda on the FATA through their influence with the 
maliks. 
The fact that the only real vote the Pashtun had was through their interaction with 
the Political Agents and his relationship with the maliks caused the tribes to seek to voice 
their opinions violently.  Generally, violence was confined to raids by individual tribes 
and clans on British lines of communication and outposts to extract weapons and rations.  
However, numerous times, including 1897, 1930, and 1937, religious figures served as 
charismatic leaders to unite the clans in the name of jihad, often with the help of tribes 
from the western side of the Durand Line and complicity from the Afghan King. 
B. THE ROOTS OF JIHAD IN THE FATA 
The manifestations of Islamist inspired rebellion in the FATA encountered by the 
British did not necessarily deter an empire already not intending to conquer the FATA, 
but they did reinforce the complexity of the cultural landscape that would have to be 
controlled.  The effort needed to control the complex religious and tribal organization of 
the FATA simply would have taken more men and material than the British Empire 
deemed prudent relative to the value of the terrain in question.  The importance of 
analyzing the British experience with jihad is to show that Wahhabi Salafist ideas and 
practices as well as political designs through the Deobandi school were not new to the 
FATA in the second half of the twentieth century.  Radical Islamist ideas and motivations 
against the perceived infidels were established in the late nineteenth century and were 
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only relatively dormant for a few decades in the FATA after Partition.61  The following 
section will look at some of the more famous cases of Islamic leaders rising to coalesce 
the tribes to violence in order to show similarities to the situation faced in the FATA 
today.  The motivations for power and personal influence then as now were as much at 
the root of jihad as was the religious motivation professed.  An important aspect to note 
is the change in traditional social order that comes about during these times of crisis 
where the mullahs leverage religion to increase their role in the tribal power system.  This 
is a trend that is more pervasively at play today, but must be placed in context historically 
in order to address how to combat Islamist militancy in the future to help with integration 
into the state. 
1. The Hadda Mulla Najmuddin and the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya 
Sufi Order 
Following the Second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880) and creation of the 
Durand Line, the Hadda Mulla initiated and led mobilizations against the British 
throughout the 1890s by targeting British communication lines and militia posts in the 
newly formed tribal areas.  The Mulla Najmuddin studied under his Sufi pir, the Akhund 
Abdul Ghaffer, in Swat during the late 1860s and early 1870s.  Abdul Ghaffer was from 
the Naqshbandiyya-Mujaddidiyya Sufi order, which stressed meshing Sufism with a 
return to the text of the Quran as a means to address the “crisis of Islam” by re-
introducing principles of individual religious practice and moving away from the role of 
the pir as sole spiritual mediator.62  Abdul Ghaffer was influenced by Sayyid Ahmed of 
Rai Bareilly during his wahhabi movement into the Eastern Pashtun regions and against 
the Sikhs in the 1820’s and 1830’s.  The wahhabi influence of Sayyid Ahmed, attained 
during a six-year trip to Mecca around 1815, led Abdul Ghaffur to strongly support 
revivalist principles and encourage his students to promote a strict adherence to the word 
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of the Quran through travel, preaching, and personal example.63  Additionally, a deep 
historical link to the Deobandi school and the Pashtun can be traced to the Rohilla 
Pasthuns that occupied parts of the Upper Pradesh area in Northern India during the 
Mughal Empire.  The Rohilla were part of the Yusufzai tribe from just east of Peshawar.  
Sayyid Ahmed grew up in Rohilla territory and was likely a Pashtun and definitely spoke 
Pashto, which allowed him to gain traction quickly in the frontier area during his jihad 
against the Sikhs and British.  The eventual founders of the Deoband school were from 
the Rohilla Pashtun areas of Northern India as well and strong circumstantial evidence 
points to Pasthun lineage being involved with the founding of Deoband.  The early 
frequency of Deoband missions to the frontier can be linked for political reasons to 
generating resistance to the British but also for ethnic and linguistic reasons as the 
graduating students were just going home to their extended families.64 
After excelling in his studies under Abdul Ghaffer, Mulla Najmuddin was sent to 
Hadda, a town 6 kilometers south of Jalalabad, where he settled and created a religious 
center in the mid-1870.  It was not coincidence that the location had a pagan history and 
was close to what would become the border with the British.65  The Hadda Mulla was 
from an insignificant family, but through his appointment by a prestigious pir he gained 
status as a recognized spiritual heir to a great saint and the ability to give instruction to 
his own disciples.  Mulla Najmuddin’s revivalist leanings were apparent immediately as 
he encouraged the people around Jalalabad to abandon the traditional Sufi customs of 
paying a bride-price, charging interest, as well as singing and dancing at celebrations and 
to only embrace customs condoned by Islam.66  As the Hadda Mulla’s reknown spread, 
his langar and number of shaykhs and talibs grew.  The langar was the “guest-house-
cum-dining hall” where the Mulla would feed and shelter the numerous travelers going 
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east and west using the Khyber Pass and moving through Jalalabad.  The Hadda Mulla 
had hundreds of shaykhs who were men that decided to stay in Hadda and serve the 
Mulla.  Shaykhs often married local women and were responsible for keeping up the 
langar.  Talibs were the students who came to learn from the Mulla and were at his 
service and direction during their stay.  The Hadda Mulla’s langar became the meeting 
place for many mullahs throughout the FATA to discuss various religious decisions for 
bigger jirgas and other legal matters.  Through these meetings and messages from his 
shaykhs and talibs, the Hadda Mulla was able to spread his teachings and gain 
information from as far as Herat and Delhi.67   
Influential mullahs such as the Hadda Mulla maintained their own lashkars 
consisting of their shaykhs and talibs as well as other Pasthun villagers from tribes they 
served.  An influential mullah’s lashkar was not subject to the same territorial limits as a 
local tribal militia.  The mullahs used their lashkars for three specific missions.  First, 
they would use their lashkars to travel with them to enforce truces or exact fines from 
tribes that they served based on previous mediation of grievances.  Second, they would 
travel to punish people in violation of religious law or those who had defied the mullah’s 
moral directives.  These two were mostly a policing function performed with the 
agreement of the tribal elders.  Finally, and a significant development as a result of 
Afghan and British encroachment on the FATA, lashkars could be used to enforce the 
mullahs political directives.68  These political directives were often directed at the British 
in the form of jihad, but were generally oriented on smaller outposts in the form of raids 
and were not intended to take or hold land.  The Hadda Mulla had a larger operation in 
mind. 
2. The Tribal Revolt of 1897 
The Hadda Mulla saw British encroachment in the form of roads, railways, and 
forts into the tribal areas during the Great Game as a threat to Islam as well as his 
personal influence.  In the summer of 1897, he was able to promote coordinated assaults 
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on well-fortified garrisons with a degree of organization among the notoriously fractious 
tribes that was unprecedented at that time in the history of British rule.  The Hadda Mulla 
did not order the tribes, but instead adroitly implicated honor and greater tribal solidarity 
to the cause of Islam as the only ideology that was able to unite the disparate social 
polities under a common flag.69  The Hadda Mulla coordinated the tribal uprisings that 
took place in the summer of 1897; they stretched from Bajaur Agency to Orakzai Agency 
and included Swat from his headquarters in Mohmand Agency.  He utilized his shaykhs 
and talibs as the conduits in his communication network to achieve this unity of action 
among the tribes.  The Political Agent in Malakand at the time gave these disciples credit 
for playing a critical role in rousing the tribes to jihad and creating uneasiness in the 
FATA.  The uprising ultimately failed based on the nature of the tribal lashkar.  The 
lashkar is a highly effective fighting organization when the battle is mobile, but faltered 
in the stagnant nature of attempting to siege the British cantonments away from their 
territory and supplies.70 Although the British prevailed from the well-supplied 
cantonments and significant reinforcements from inside India, the mullahs sent a message 
that lingering in the FATA would not go uncontested. 
Winston Churchill was in Malakand during the tribal uprisings in 1897.  Churchill 
attributed the “predilection of the illiterate tribes for taking rumors at face value” as 
creating the possibility for whispers of holy war breathed into a race of “intensely 
passionate and fanatical” people to transform a slightly crazed malcontent into a “mighty 
man who had risen to lead” the tribes. He saw the Mulla’s efforts in organizing the tribes 
as a battle for the “soul of India” pitting the march of civilization against ignorance and 
superstition.71  Churchill’s opinions were not entirely off the mark, but the Hadda Mulla 
was more concerned with keeping Islam pure and consolidating his network of religious 
leaders in the region mutually agreed to be autonomous by the Afghans and British.  The 
Hadda Mulla resisted the Afghan monarchy’s attempts to exert influence in the FATA as 
well, although not under the banner of jihad.  The Hadda Mulla was not the first mullah 
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to call various tribes to jihad and he would not be the last, but his pirimuridi line would 
inhabit the FATA and slowly contribute to the erosion of Sufism and its institutions 
through revisionist teachings.72 
Haji Sahib Turangzai was significant in firmly establishing the Hadda Mulla’s 
line in the FATA.  Before studying under the Hadda Mulla, Turangzai had two significant 
experiences that shaped his religious understanding.  First, he studied at the Darul Ulum 
in Deoband and developed a deep friendship with the chancellor and ultimately travelled 
to Mecca to perform haj with members from the Deobandi school.  While in Mecca, he 
met Haji Imdadullah, a member of the wahhabi movement, and took bait at his hand.  
Turangzai promised to promote revivalism and opposition to the British in the spirit of 
Sayyid Ahmed’s mission.73  Turangzai would later take bait at the hand of Hadda Mulla 
and move to the FATA in 1914 with others from the pirimuridi line of the Hadda Mulla 
to serve the “socially and culturally distinct” tribal areas of Pashtun society.74  Resistance 
to British occupation near the FATA would continue after the Third Anglo-Afghan War 
and throughout the 1920s the mullahs and tribes of the FATA would continue to 
consolidate their autonomy from Afghanistan and the British infused with Islamic 
revivalist tendencies as a result of the Hadda Mulla’s teachings.  
The Hadda Mulla’s influence in the tribal revolt of 1897 was significant in that it 
contributed to the British carving out the settled areas of the NWFP into the writ of the 
central government in 1901.  At the same time Dir, Chitral, Swat and the FATA were left 
semi-autonomous and subject to the FCR due in part to the complexities presented by the 
tribes and their response to religiously inspired militancy.  These complexities combined 
with the same strategic calculus relative to the Russians further convinced the British that 
conquering the FATA was not necessary.  Islamist militancy would nevertheless remain a 
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factor in the frontier as the British continued to seek a balance between controlling the 
settled districts and keeping the frontier at arms length to achieve relative security in the 
Indus River Valley.  The Faqir of Ipi would rise from the Hadda Mulla line in 1936 to 
challenge heightened British retaliations and encroachment onto tribal tradition as well as 
remain politically active in keeping the tribes of the FATA autonomous during Partition. 
C. THE FAQIR OF IPI AND CONTINUED RESISTANCE 
The British Empire began to retrench in the early twentieth century to combat a 
rising Germany closer to home and their consolidation of assets was hastened following 
the catastrophic effects of World War I.  Nonetheless, they retained their interest in the 
commercial benefits of India.  The Third Anglo-Afghan War led to reduced dispersion in 
the frontier, but the British were continually plagued by annoying tribal uprisings for the 
remainder of their rule in India.  Cultural encroachment into the frontier fueled further 
religiously inspired resistance and the frontier was used for political leverage from the 
center for various political agendas leading up to partition 
1. The Third Anglo-Afghan War and the Modified Forward Policy 
The only change in the implementation of violence during British rule was in the 
escalation of force caused by improvements in the weapons available.  The Pashtun 
benefitted from the Persian gunrunning trade that could bring better rifles to the FATA by 
circumventing British controlled areas.75  Additionally the British implemented machine 
guns and aircraft in suppressing the tribes following World War I. The Royal Air Force 
was instrumental in dispersing tribal lashkars attempting to form in order to attack British 
cantonments throughout the 1920s and 30s. 
The last serious threat directly caused by Afghanistan occurred in 1919 after 
General Dyer’s Gurkhas opened fired on a protest staged in Amritsar in the Punjab killing 
379 civilians and wounding 1200 more.  The new Afghan King Amanullah acted to 
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distract questions about his legitimacy domestically by proposing to take Peshawar under 
the call for jihad in response to the shootings in Amritsar.  The British defeated the 
Afghan encroachment within the year leading to the Treaty of Rawalpindi and marking 
the end of the Anglo-Afghan Wars.  Notably the treaty reaffirmed the Durand Line, but 
also relinquished the British right to control Afghan foreign policy.76  After the Third 
Anglo-Afghan War the British switched to the Modified Forward Policy, which involved 
consolidating British troops in larger cantonments and using more khassadars to police 
the frontier resulting in relatively reduced violence due to reduced presence.  The 
khassadars were local tribesman paid to perform “watch and ward” duties including 
securing roads and intercepting tribal raids on the British cantonments.77  The British 
hoped that if they left the tribes of the FATA alone, they would leave them alone, but that 
is not what happened. 
2. Political Use of Islamic Groups in the Frontier 
The 1920s saw an increasing involvement from Indian political parties in the 
frontier area as a result of the Khilafat movement and the Jamiat Ulama-i Hind 
organization of the Deobandis extending their reach in the form of the Jamiat Ulama-i 
Sarhad.  The Khudai Khidmatgar or “Red Shirts” were established locally under Ghaffar 
Khan and with the Jamiat Ulama-i Sarhad were a source of Pashtun nationalism 
influenced by Gandhi’s theory of peaceful non-cooperation.  These groups were based in 
the NWFP and were only relevant within the provincial borders as they viewed the tribes 
of the FATA as having “no interest in economics, industry, agriculture or education” and 
as being too immersed “in custom and ritual and occupied in the realm of militancy.”78  
This however did not prevent ideas from spreading into the FATA to include the passing 
of the Sarda Act in 1927, a piece of legislation dictating minimum marrying ages 
throughout the British Raj.  This act, seen as foreign meddling in tribal tradition, as well 
as the politics of the time seeking to exclude the FATA, including allowances, resulted in 
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a series of uprisings led by mullahs in 1930 from Mohmand to South Waziristan that at 
one point threatened Peshawar.  The British heightened their response to such actions and 
used the Royal Air Force to bomb and kill thousands of tribesmen, which succeeded in 
dispersing the lashkars of up to 7,000 men in some areas.  Haroon noted the significance 
of the locality and involvement of politics in the perception of these actions: 
These events had injected a greater credibility into the threat posed by the 
mullas because it appeared that the centre of discontent was no longer the 
independent territories or Afghanistan – rather it seemed the inspiration 
for mobilization could come from within India by the activities of the 
Congress party assisted by an unscrupulous campaign of lies and 
exaggeration to excite religious fanaticism.79  
The conflict in 1930 set the stage for the Faqir of Ipi’s actions in 1936 and 1937 in 
response to additional legislation going against tribal tradition and the development of 
Islamist political parties from the center seeking influence in the frontier.  The uprisings 
in 1936 and 1937 combined with penetration of the frontier by these Islamist groups from 
the center ultimately contributed to the push for Pakistan as called for in the Lahore 
Resolution as well as Pakistan following in British footsteps and leaving the FATA 
autonomous and relying on less costly means of influencing the tribes. 
3. The Faqir of Ipi 
Mirza Ali of Ipi received his religious education in the Hadda Mulla line and was 
later somewhat influenced by the khilafatists in India before settling as the Faqir of Ipi in 
the Tochi Valley in Bannu district.  In 1936, a dispute arose over a Hindu girl who had 
allegedly converted to Islam and married a Pasthun in Bannu.  The girl’s parents accused 
the man of abducting their daughter and cited the marriage as unlawful according to the 
Sarda Act due to the girl being a minor; however, the girl refused to return to her parents.  
A government investigation found no evidence for abduction or legal consent to marry 
and ruled that the girl would remain with a third party until she was of age and then she 
could decide her own fate.  The Muslim community in Bannu saw the decision as 
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favoritism by the government for “the Hindu Community over the Muslim one.”80  The 
Faqir was among those angered and called a jirga to gain support for his jihad from other 
mullahs in the tribal areas.  In November of 1936, the Faqir attacked a British military 
force moving into the Tochi Valley with a 2,000-man lashkar and forced the British to 
retreat.  The victory brought another 1,200 men to the Faqir from Waziristan and readied 
him for more violence after the winter had passed.81 
Despite attempted payoffs to the maliks of the Tochi Valley by the British, the 
Faqir had mustered up to 4,000 men from at least four tribes in the spring of 1937.  The 
British would again use their Royal Air Force to disperse the jihad and mitigate the 
penetration of the Faqir’s movement east.  The motivations of the warriors fighting with 
the Faqir probably ranged from defending autonomy to the spoils of raids and the 
possibility of target practice against the British army.  Once autonomy was again 
relatively secure and the prospects for gaining wealth made difficult by the Royal Air 
Force, the movement was ceased.  However the events of 1936 and 1937 led by a 
“mullah” in reaction to a judgment concerning one woman increased British fear that “the 
Tribal Areas policy could only partly contain and regulate human action” as if anymore 
proof was needed at that point.82  The British applied pressure on the tribes to hand over 
the Faqir of Ipi, but his popularity and mystique allowed him to avoid capture although 
he was forced to keep his actions smaller and reduced to annoying raids until just after 
Partition due to the increasing trend in British policy of using disproportionate force in 
dealing with the tribes. 
The importance of the discussion of the Faqir is the similarity to what we see 
today with the Afghan Taliban, Al Qaeda leadership, and the TTP in their ability to 
maintain safe haven in the FATA and surrounding area at least until very recently.  The 
people may or may not be in agreement with the militants, but the populations’ 
perception is that the threat from the militants is greater due to proximity.  The Pakistani 
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government’s operations in the FATA in 2002, 2004, and 2006 were similar to the British 
in that they violently imposed their will and then left the areas to be reoccupied by the 
Islamist militants.  The British could afford to accept the violence generated on their 
western periphery, but Pakistan can no longer ignore the increased threat posed by the 
successors to the Hadda Mulla and Faqir of Ipi.  
D. SUMMARY 
Britain fought two wars in Afghanistan to limit Russian influence in South Asia 
and prevent any move on India.  Strategically, these efforts succeeded in stopping Russia 
at the Amu Darya River despite tactical failures in dealing with a complex Afghan power 
structure.  Britain did enough to maintain the Durand Line as a buffer from Russian 
encroachment into Central Asia.  For a variety of reasons, the Soviets never pushed far 
enough south during British rule to cause them to need to occupy and more fully control 
the tribes in the FATA, so they did not.  The British faced numerous violent uprisings in 
the tribal areas, often inspired by charismatic mullahs calling for jihad, but they never 
threatened the vital interests in greater British India.   
The history of British colonialism in the frontier was marked by using the stick 
time and again to punish large uprisings and then falling back to attempt the carrot in 
paying the tribes to be peaceful.  In Waziristan alone, the British suffered over 1,822 
raids from the Mehsud and Wazir tribes into the Bannu and Dera Ismail Khan Districts 
from 1910 to 1942.83  Throughout the FATA, the British essentially paid the tribes to 
leave British interests alone with sporadic success without asking anything in return other 
than the opportunity for medals of valor for military personnel serving here during the 
many conflicts. Pax Britannica never really extended outside of government property and 
100 meters off either side of the main roads.  The British never controlled the FATA 
because they never found a deliberate, sustained effort worth the cost when they could 
garner the benefits derived from the Indus River valley without putting forth the men and 
material.  
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A senior British official commenting specifically on Waziristan, but summing up 
the whole colonial period in the FATA, simply stated, “what a record of futility it all 
is!”84  There is no doubt that locally, futility is exactly what was felt by those tasked with 
duty on the frontier; however, the overall effort was far from futile as the actions taken to 
punish and appease the tribal belt protected the crown jewel for over a century.   Jihad 
against the British was definitely a forbearer of the fight against the Soviets and today’s 
conflicts, but greater geopolitical concerns are what kept the British from occupying and 
controlling the FATA, and ultimately abandoning the frontier and leaving it to Pakistan 
altogether.  The British aphorism for their policy in the Northwest of “rule the Punjabis, 
intimidate the Sindhis, buy the Pashtun, and honour the Baluch” seems to be a policy that 
Pakistan would revisit in the next half-century.85  The next chapter will provide analysis 
of the perceptions of Pakistani leadership toward the FATA, the geopolitical context that 
drove them to retain the policy of leaving the FATA semi-autonomous, and the evolution 
of Islamic militancy into a tool of the state. 
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IV. PAKISTAN AND THE FATA 
Just after midnight on August 15, 1947, the British lowered the “Union Jack, 
emblazoned with the Star of India,” from the flagpole at the Viceroy’s House in New 
Delhi and ushered in the independence of one-fifth of the population of the world.86  The 
push for Indian independence that began in 1857 reached its culmination with a bloody 
Partition of the subcontinent into Pakistan and India.87  Mohammad Ali Jinnah espoused 
his two nation theory in 1940 through the Lahore Resolution that demanded the creation 
of a nation where the “Muslims of British India would be permitted to lead their lives 
according to their political, social, and religious culture.”88  The challenge for Jinnah was 
that the Muslims of India desired independence for differing reasons depending on if they 
were a peasant from Bengal, an urban worker from Delhi, or a landowner in what is today 
Pakistan.  Additionally, Jinnah had to contend with the fact that not all Muslims were in 
favor of dividing India.  Significantly, the Muslims of Northwest British India wanted an 
Islamic state to serve as a “safe haven for the followers of Islam” with a government 
guided by the Quran.89  The ultimate vision of Pakistan was just forming when 
administrators and security personnel had to deal with the very practical issues of people 
and materials.  Partition pushed six million people out of Pakistan and eight million 
Muslims from India into Pakistan during the largest migration of refugees experienced in 
history.  Additionally, officials attempted to divide the territory and assets into “bundles 
of 82.5 percent for India and 17.5 percent for Pakistan” including civic infrastructure, the 
armed forces and their equipment, money, and methods of transport.90  The animosity 
caused by the division of British India has created a shadow that has to date prevented 
stability on the subcontinent.  
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The following chapter will address the changing perspective that various Pakistani 
administrations had concerning the FATA, the geopolitical context that shaped their 
policies, and the growing role that political Islam would assume in influencing Pakistan’s 
strategies toward the region.  The pervasive shadow of Pakistan’s security dilemma with 
India has remained a constant, but the U.S., Saudi Arabia, the Soviet Union, China, Iran, 
and Afghanistan were major players that contributed to ultimately destabilizing the 
FATA in attempting to achieve their national interests.  JI and JUI emerged from 
Partition as the two major Islamic political parties that have shaped the role of violent 
radicalism while maintaining small, legitimate roles within the political system.  The 
chapter will consider these factors and how they shaped policy toward the FATA through 
the lens of the post-Partition era, the PPP administration of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the 
military rule of General Zia ul-Haq, and the post-Zia democracies that resulted in 
supporting the Taliban.  The trend observed is a cascading effect of increasingly 
supporting militancy in the form of radical Islamism in an effort to achieve national 
interests in relation to India and Afghanistan that has now turned on the state. 
A. THE FATA FOLLOWING PARTITION 
The FATA and Balochistan were least influenced by the migrations following 
Partition.  The tribes of the FATA were also politically removed from the concerns 
growing between India and Pakistan over the new international border and the 
questionable status of Kashmir.  Jinnah and subsequent leaders were rightfully far more 
concerned with establishing the validity of the idea of Pakistan as a Muslim state than 
changing the convenience of maintaining the status quo in the FATA due to the 
significant geographic and cultural challenges caused by the separation between East and 
West Pakistan as well as the diversity among the people of West Pakistan itself.  The 
immediate conflict in Kashmir in 1947 and the subsequent war in 1965 kept the majority 
of Pakistan’s military and political effort focused east on their rivalry with India.  
Pakistan did not need trouble in the west, so they initially kept the peace and secured the 
loyalty of the Pashtun tribes the only way they new how . . . by continuing to pay them 
for good behavior.  Afghanistan was a pervasive annoyance in attempting to undermine 
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this effort, but without having a better deal to offer the tribes, their intentions were little 
more than rhetoric that could be handled diplomatically for the first couple of decades. A 
few of the Pashtun tribes helped their cause immediately by mobilizing in support of the 
Muslims in Kashmir and gave Jinnah reason to reinforce their autonomy. 
1. Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India 
The first use of the tribes of the FATA to promote militancy on behalf of 
Pakistani national interests occurred almost immediately after the state’s creation.  Just 
two months after Partition, as the Pakistan Government was busy building up an 
administration from scratch with no armed forces to speak of at their disposal, the First 
Kashmir War broke out involving the fate of a majority Muslim state ruled by a Hindu 
prince.  Tribesman from the FATA, specifically Wazirs, Mehsuds, and Afridis, invaded 
Kashmir spurned on with food, fuel, money, and equipment by the Muslim League to 
help decide the fate of their fellow Muslims.91  Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s involvement in 
using the tribes of the FATA in this conflict is uncertain, but the benefits gained from 
their help no doubt shaped his initial sentiment toward the tribes.  During his first visit to 
Peshawar to address the tribal elders in 1948, Jinnah affirmed that Pakistan “had no 
desire to interfere in their internal freedom; rather it wanted to put them on their legs 
through educational, economic and social uplift as self-respecting citizens, who have the 
opportunities of fully developing and producing what is best” in their land. Notably he 
also promised to continue paying allowances as long as they remained faithful and loyal 
to Pakistan.92  Pakistan’s eyes were fixed on the problems created with India over 
Partition and pursued policies toward the FATA very similar to the British almost as a 
default response instead of tackling integration into the new democratic Islamic state. 
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Afghanistan would also play a role with Indian monetary aid in not allowing the 
frontier to integrate into Pakistan.  The Indian Congress Party had been very active and 
held considerable sway in the NWFP beginning in the 1920s.  Their agenda was to 
promote sentiment toward a unified India among the tribes of the NWFP by promising an 
equal role in the eventual government.  As mentioned earlier, the Khudai Khidmatgar or 
“Red Shirts” were established locally under Ghaffar Khan and were a proponent of 
Pashtun nationalism influenced by Gandhi’s theory of peaceful non-cooperation. The 
Congress Party was not happy about the immediate deterioration of Indo-Pakistan 
relations and “Indian money joined Afghan money in fomenting the campaign for an 
independent Pathan State among all who could be induced to listen.”93  All Pashtuns 
including those in the FATA were very interested in independence; however, Jinnah had 
already assured their autonomy including subsidies so their loyalty would remain intact to 
Pakistan as long as the deal held. 
The Pashtun loyalty did not stop Afghanistan’s arguments of the invalidity of the 
Durand Line and the demand for a Pashtun state as soon as Partition became inevitable.  
A plebiscite was held on July 20, 1947 allowing the Pashtuns in the frontier to choose 
between India and Pakistan.  Pakistan received an overwhelming victory of 289,244 to 
2,874, but the results were contested on two grounds.  First, only 55.5% of the electorate 
voted due to the Khudai Khidmatgar boycotting because they wanted a unified India or 
independence for the NWFP.  Second, Afghanistan argued that the option to be a part of 
Afghanistan or the creation of an independent state including all Pashtuns was not 
offered.94  Afghanistan formalized their rejection of Pakistan by voicing the only 
negative vote of admittance to the United Nations and began pushing for the state of 
Pashtunistan as a means to extend their influence to the east.  Afghanistan’s arguments, 
although incompatible, were clearly geared toward pulling the Pashtuns in Pakistan into 
their sphere of influence.  If the Durand Line were not the international border, then they 
wanted all Pashtuns to be a part of Afghanistan, but in arguing for a Pashtunistan they 
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would be legitimizing the Durand Line or ceding some of their territory to the new state, 
which was not their intention.95  The argument for Pashtunistan has remained a quiet 
roar, but Pakistan’s benign neglect of the FATA did not give the autonomous tribes a 
reason to request independence and the loss of their allowances.  At the same time, 
Pakistan pursued no policies that would mitigate their autonomy to produce real 
integration into the central government. 
2. British Policies Continued 
Administration of the FATA changed very little as the Indian Independence Act 
abrogated all special treaties with the frontier prior to Partition in June of 1947.  Jinnah 
decided not to base troops in the region after 200 tribal elders signed an instrument of 
accession to Pakistan in return for continued subsidies.  Local administration still fell to 
the Political Agents but his mandate was broadened to include overseeing development 
projects through his Agency Councilors and Assistant Political Agents.  The FATA did 
not receive as much funding or attention as the settled districts, therefore many of the 
human rights concerns, education reforms, and poverty reduction were never addressed.  
The FCR remained the law of the land and the new constitution only allowed one 
representative from the FATA initially into the National Assembly.  The constitution of 
1973 increased this number to eight out of 342 seats in the National Assembly, but these 
representatives were chosen from 35,000 of the maliks as adult franchise was not granted 
to all until 1997.96  The difference in representation is understandable given the history 
and difference in administration.  As Wayne Wilcox asked, “when the social fabric of the 
state is stable only at the cost of economic inequity in favor of a warlike minority, how 
can majority rule function?”97 
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Pakistan continued to leave this “warlike minority” for the most part legally and 
economically autonomous due to the constant conflict on their eastern border with India.   
The Second Kashmir War in 1965 and India’s relative success against the Pakistani 
military only drove Pakistan to further strengthen their defenses against potential Indian 
offensive action toward the Punjab corridor.  The decision to leave East Pakistan only 
lightly defended further “stoked the embers” of Bengali sub-nationalism that would lead 
to the third Indo-Pakistani War six years later.  The secessionist movement in Bangladesh 
and crushing defeat of the Pakistani Army brought into question Islam as the lone reason 
for nation building in South Asia as was called for in Jinnah’s “two-nation theory”, which 
propounded that “the Muslims and Hindus of South Asia constituted two distinct, 
primordial nations.”98  The Bengalis and East Pakistan were a cultural and geographic 
challenge to the Pakistani Government, but the symbolic blow to the idea of the Muslim 
state was what could not be repeated anywhere in West Pakistan without delegitimizing 
the entire nation.  Islam increasingly established itself in the politics of Pakistan as a 
means to create contagion in the country despite the cultural differences between the 
Baloch, Pashtun, Sindhis, and Punjabis.  
3. Origins of JI and JUI and Continued Activism by the Mullahs 
The Partition of British India briefly changed the nature of religious activism in 
the FATA by removing the infidel threat.  More importantly, the debates surrounding 
what Partition would look like led to the formation of the two most important Islamist 
political movements in Pakistan, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI).  JI 
was formed in August of 1941 by Maulana Abul Ala Mawdudi to rival the Muslim 
League, which he viewed as a secular party, for leadership in creating a Muslim state.99  
JI was an organization designed to institutionalize a movement of Islamic renewal among 
Muslims by creating a devout vanguard of technocrats and activists from the educated 
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middle class of Pakistan’s urban centers.  In contrast, JUI was pro-Muslim league when it 
split from Jamiat Ulema-e-Hind and their support of the Indian National Congress in 
1945.  JUI found its constituency from a rural support base and the clerical classes, but 
like JI, had limited influence in the frontier at Partition.100   
Although small numerically, JI’s educated vanguard was particularly influential in 
the first decade of Pakistan’s history in putting forth the vision of an ideal state with 
Sharia as its legal code and government serving as an Islamic institution vice a secular 
master.  Mawdudi wanted Islam to work from the outside-in, but once Pakistan was 
created, argued that social and individual reformation was impossible without an Islamic 
state structure.  Mawdudi and JI’s efforts were successful in shaping the first constitution 
in 1956 through an annex called the Objectives Resolution that stated among other things 
that sovereignty belongs to Allah alone, but He has delegated it to Pakistan to be 
exercised within the limits prescribed by Him.101  However, when Pakistan’s first 
military ruler, Ayub Khan, assumed power in 1958, he immediately banned political 
parties and marginalized the Islamists in an attempt to modernize and further secularize 
the state.  JI’s confrontation with the martial state during the 1960s would later shape its’ 
interaction with the military and bureaucratic elite of Zia’s regime.  Mawdudi began to 
blame the Americans for Pakistan’s problems as early as 1960 when stating that the U.S. 
“does not want Muslim nations to remain Muslim” and that they “support dictatorships 
against democracy” due to their policies being “possessed by the devil called Jewry.”102  
These comments sound familiar to similar expressions of Pakistani resentment toward the 
U.S. found today in the FATA and throughout Pakistan.  JUI took a back seat to the 
Muslim League following Partition and would not become as influential in shaping 
politics until the 1970s. 
In the FATA, Partition brought the question of the status of the tribes back to the 
forefront of regional politics.  As stated previously, Afghanistan saw the creation of an 
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independent Muslim nation that included the Pashtun border region as a challenge to 
ethnic ties and its claim to be the only free Islamic state at the time.  The Durand Line 
remained in question as no deal was ever made between Pakistan and Afghanistan and 
the British agreement in 1893 had only loosely been followed anyway.  The Faqir of Ipi 
came back into the picture at this time by claiming that the unity of the tribes of the 
FATA was more important than the unity of Islam in a bid for personal power.  Others 
that supported the Deobandis and Khudai Khidmatgars were equally disappointed and the 
idea of a Pashtunistan was given fuel internally by the mullahs to the great concern of the 
Muslim League.  Ironically, the tribes from the FATA fought most vigorously to liberate 
Kashmir from the Hindus; however, it must be recognized that they probably fought more 
to acquire the booty from war in Kashmir than for true Islamic solidarity.  Containing the 
influential mullahs was part of the reason Jinnah promptly thanked the tribesman and 
promised to remove all garrisons from the FATA, continue the provision of allowances to 
the tribes, and allow them to maintain their autonomy.103 He really had few other choices 
at the time due to severely constrained assets.  The idea of Pashtunistan remained a part 
of Afghan rhetoric, but with autonomy promised, the Faqir’s ambition to be the head of a 
Pashtun state lost momentum. 
It appeared to the FATA’s political administrators and the Afghans that mullahs 
were the instigators in voicing opinions that sought to keep the Pashtun tribal culture 
separate and attempted to undermine the authority of the Punjab province centered nation 
state.  Haroon notes that with Partition emerged a “persistent truth-that, as during the 
colonial period, the claims put forward by religious leaders were not for union” with any 
state, “but for greater regional autonomy and recognition of their own positions as leaders 
among the tribes.”104  These observations ring true today with the irredentist agendas 
being put forward by the TTP in a bid to secure their hold on power in the frontier.   
Prior to the 1971 war with India over East Pakistan, Pakistan was consumed with 
attempting to create and stabilize a country and a government.  Rightfully, their concern 
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was on their security dilemma with India and economic and electoral power sharing with 
the Bengalis.  The FATA was seen as a less pressing issue and Islamist militancy was 
relatively dormant as the role of Islam in the state of Pakistan was still being defined.  
The annexation of Bangladesh forced Pakistan to seek solidarity from its remaining four 
provinces and increase dependency from the FATA to promote loyalty.  Following the 
1971 war, Zulfiqar Bhutto remained focused on India, but was forced to give more 
attention to the frontier in order to prevent any more territory undermining the “raison 
d’être” of Pakistan as a state for Muslims on the subcontinent.105 
B. 1971–1977 
Internally, the 1971 war was caused by a failure by Islamabad’s ability to respond 
to the needs of East Pakistan and inflexibility in negotiating to accommodate their 
democratically elected party’s agenda.  India overcame fears of Chinese intervention to 
support the Bengali resistance and ultimately intervened to help create Bangladesh in 
order to eliminate the refugee crisis caused by Pakistani military crackdowns and remove 
a hostile Pakistani military presence to their east.106  Following the embarrassing defeat 
of Pakistan and the capture of over 90,000 soldiers in less than a month, Yahya Khan 
resigned and ceded the Presidency to Zulfiqar Bhutto in order to avoid another coup and 
in response to public outrage at the loss of East Pakistan.  Bhutto began his presidency 
with a new sense of urgency in maintaining and shoring up the territorial integrity of 
Pakistan and reestablishing Pakistan’s diminished power in its security dilemma with 
India.  The frontier began to be leveraged toward this end under the Bhutto 
administration and, once again, loyalty and peace in the FATA was more important than 
integration. 
1. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto 
Lawrence Ziring claims that Bhutto, in his role as deputy Prime Minister, could 
have prevented the war, but chose not to do so because he believed the “nation was better 
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served by the secession of East Pakistan.”107  Regardless, after the liberation of East 
Pakistan into Bangladesh, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the Pakistan People’s 
Party (PPP) desired to make the western frontier and interests in Kashmir secure.  In 
order to do this, many development projects were launched in the FATA from 1972 until 
1977 and, through bilateral engagement with India, a new line of control was established 
in Kashmir and India agreed to pull its forces back from territory seized during the 1971 
war.  Despite these projects, no attempt was made to change the FCR or Political Agent 
system and taxation was never in question due to the need for loyalty on the border.  In 
order to understand why both of these efforts would eventually fail, understanding the 
geopolitical context in which Bhutto and Pakistan found itself is essential. 
Bhutto saw his role as Chairman being similar to that of Mao’s in China and his 
socialist PPP as having much more in common with the communist nations of the world 
than the U.S.  Additionally, the U.S.’s ambivalent actions during the wars in 1965 and 
1971 combined with the arms embargo against Pakistan led Bhutto to believe he needed 
to distance himself from Washington.  At the same time, U.S. and China relations were 
improving and the Soviet Union wanted to get closer to India as a counterpoint to U.S. 
influence in the area.  Therefore, the Soviets played on India’s lingering sense of 
humiliation following the 1962 Sino-Indian War to provide military equipment to India in 
order to improve their international image by “having a large, democratic, Third World 
state as a quasi-ally.”108  India jumped at the chance to have protection from further 
Chinese aggression.  The Soviet and Indian alliance only pushed China closer to Pakistan 
and a few years later was a contributing factor to substantial U.S. aid following the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan.  
The loss of Bangladesh also drove Bhutto to pull away from SEATO and other 
Southeast Asian concerns and to seek to strengthen his ties in CENTO with the Middle 
Eastern countries.109  The 1973 constitution even stated that Pakistan would “endeavor to 
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preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic 
identity.”110  Bhutto sought to strengthen his ties to the Muslim world by hosting an 
Islamic Summit Conference in 1974 in Lahore attended by King Faisal, Anwar al-Sadat, 
Hafiz al-Assad, Muammar Qaddafi, and Yasser Arafat.  During the conference, he 
avoided the topic of Kashmir and chose to attack Israel and show solidarity with the 
Palestinians in a veiled attempt to get the Muslim world involved with the Kashmir issue.  
Later that same year, India shocked the world when they detonated a nuclear device.  
Bhutto took this opportunity to tap into his new network of friends to call for an “Islamic 
bomb” to level the playing field with the Communists, Christians, and Hindus.111  
Regionally, Bhutto also leveraged the Shah of Iran to help him influence the politics of 
the Durand Line with Afghanistan.  Notably, the closer relationship with the Muslim 
world allowed many Islamist organizations to begin penetrating and growing the number 
of madrassas in Pakistan, which would influence the domestic landscape in the years to 
come.  Bhutto’s vision of himself as “a great international figure and the major political 
personality in the Islamic world” drove him to seek supreme leadership in Pakistan at the 
cost of domestic stability.112 
Domestically, Bhutto restructured the economy, improved the public sector, and 
established constitutional consensus among different political players.  The remarkably 
dynamic improvements in the country could have been finished and lasted had it not been 
for the serious character flaws Bhutto demonstrated in seeking to stay in power.113  
Bhutto ultimately abandoned his socialist program and ideology in favor of individual 
survival and after a 1974 altercation over political appointments with J.A. Rahim, the true 
founder of the PPP, the socialist aspects of Bhutto’s regime were never the same.  The 
altruism of the social and economic reforms was derailed without the participation of the 
leftist thinking original leaders and Bhutto’s aristocratic roots began to show in his desire 
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to keep power.114  In the frontier, Bhutto’s desire to repress political dissent would 
emerge in Balochistan and the NWFP, the two provinces without a PPP majority.  
The PPP’s socialist agenda upset the traditional power relationships in 
Balochistan and the NWFP where the leadership saw social reform as intrusive.  Mir 
Ghaus Bakhsh Kahn Bizenjo, the Balochi Governor, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his son, 
Wali Khan, were all outspoken against Bhutto’s policies.  Wali Khan even took to 
describing the Prime Minister as “Adolph Bhutto.”  Bhutto perceived the collusion as 
“forming a Pashtun-Balochi alliance, with assistance provided by Kabul, New Delhi, and 
their superpower mentor, the Soviet Union.”115  Bhutto, unable to tolerate dissent, 
ordered General Tikka Khan to undertake a protracted war with the militants of the 
Baloch Liberation Front, which would end up forcing the Balochi tribesman to retreat and 
find refuge in the mountains between Pakistan and Afghanistan in the southern frontier.  
Balochistan, unlike the FATA, had to remain firmly within the writ of the state because 
of the emerging potential for natural resources and the need for another warm water port 
further from influence by the Indian Navy as a result of the blockade of Karachi during 
the 1971 war.  These actions would ultimately contribute to undermining the social and 
economic initiative begun in the FATA under Bhutto’s regime. 
The PPP’s agenda in trying to improve the FATA was rooted in Bhutto’s initial 
attempts to redefine Pakistan and solidify loyalty.  The schemes to develop irrigation 
systems, construct new schools and colleges, improve roads, build textile mills, and 
attempts to generate electricity were all embarked upon to win the “hearts and minds” of 
the tribes.  The Interior Ministry exerted great effort in keeping the tribes informed of the 
execution of these development projects as well as reinforcing their territorial integrity in 
order to maintain the FATA’s loyalty as they condemned Afghanistan for revisiting the 
idea of Pashtunistan.116  Bhutto’s diplomatic efforts along these lines were successful in 
persuading King Zahir Shah and his reformed government in dropping the issue of 
Pashtunistan.  However, when Mohammed Daud Khan came back to power in 
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Afghanistan following the coup in 1973, Bhutto saw territorial integrity as a serious issue 
again.  Bhutto would ultimately use Islamist dissent in Afghanistan to address the 
territorial issue. 
2. Zulfiqar Bhutto and JUI 
The more populist rhetoric of the PPP resonated with the constituency of JUI and 
led to a Tripartite Agreement in 1972 that brought JUI to power in the Northwest Frontier 
Province (NWFP) as the first Islamist party to hold a substantial political office in 
Pakistan.  During this time, JI viewed socialism as kafir and therefore its influence 
suffered during the Presidency of Bhutto.117  The JUI leader, Mufti Mahmud, serving as 
Chief Minister of NWFP, banned alcohol and reformed the inheritance laws in line with 
Sharia as part of a vigorous Islamization program in the Province.118  The Islamist efforts 
of JUI were somewhat in contrast to Bhutto’s development projects in the frontier from 
1972 to 1977.  The PPP government’s efforts to bring more roads, schools, and industry 
in to the frontier were intended to win over the population as stated previously, but the 
real motivation was to promote territorial integrity of the frontier tribes and loyalty to 
Islamabad.119 
Territorial integrity was an issue because of Mohammad Daud Khan’s increased 
rhetoric and action toward inspiring the Pashtun tribes in Pakistan to push for the creation 
of an irredentist Pashtunistan.  Bhutto reacted by implementing his version of a forward 
policy in strategically supporting the political Islamist movement that had developed in 
Afghanistan in the early 1970s led by men such as Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmad Shah 
Masoud, and Gulbadin Hekmatyar.  The Afghan Islamists, many of whom established 
themselves in the frontier in 1973, were opposed to the secular oriented Daud regime and 
did not support Kabul’s policy of Pashtunistan.  The Afghan Islamists activated military 
training camps in North and South Waziristan with support from Islamabad to resist 
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Daud.  In a trend that would foreshadow the next 30 years of Pakistani state sponsored 
militancy, Bhutto kept the support of the Afghan Islamists a secret by enlisting them in 
the Frontier Corps as trainees.  The irony of a modernizing, socialist leader backing 
Islamists against another modernizing leader in Afghanistan demonstrates the truth that 
ideologies other than religion have found little footing in the realist politics of South 
Asia.  Before Islamabad stopped its assistance due to improved relations with Kabul, the 
Afghan Islamists had already forged strong links with JI and JUI who were beginning to 
receive substantial financial aid from Saudi Arabia as a result of Bhutto’s Middle Eastern 
policies.120  Despite the Islamists links fostered under the Bhutto regime, the Islamist 
groups in Pakistan had turned away from Bhutto and entered into the coalition in the 
1977 elections that sought the removal of the PPP.  The questionable elections in 1977 
created domestic turmoil that forced General Zia ul-Haq to action despite having been 
appointed by Bhutto to lead the Army. 
Bhutto took no real steps to integrate the FATA for many of the same reasons that 
leaders before him had failed to take action.  He needed a Pashtun population nominally 
loyal to Pakistan to validate the Muslim state and maintain the idea of Pashtunistan as a 
strictly Afghan creation.  His actions to more closely align Pakistan to the Middle Eastern 
countries allowed access by wealthy Muslim donors to begin the spread of Wahhabi 
madrassas in Pakistan that would not boom until Zia’s regime.  Bhutto’s early backing of 
what would become the mujahideen combined with only moderate social and economic 
penetration of the FATA set the stage for the conversion of the frontier into a territory 
beset by 30 years of Islamist insurgency.  General Zia accelerated this process as Pakistan 
found itself thrust into the middle of the Cold War. 
C. 1978–1994 
General Zia-ul-Haq overthrew the Bhutto regime on July 5, 1977, in the second 
coup in Pakistan’s cyclical political history.  Following the coup in Pakistan in 1977, the 
new leaders, Mohammad Daud and General Zia, continued to reduce tensions and clear 
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the way for improved bilateral relations on the Durand Line.  However, this progress and 
any development in the FATA would cease following the Saur Revolution in Afghanistan 
and the subsequent Soviet invasion, which would permanently change the landscape of 
the frontier areas beginning in 1979.121  If Pakistan was even moderately beginning to 
penetrate the FATA socially and economically, any sustained and deliberate attempt to 
modernize the FATA was abandoned due to geopolitical actions and domestic turmoil.  
Two revolutions would shape the trajectory of Zia’s rule in Pakistan.  The Saur 
Revolution in Afghanistan in 1978 followed by the Soviet invasion the following year 
and the Iranian Revolution in 1979 would put Pakistan on a trajectory of Islamization that 
would spiral out of control in the frontier.  
The Soviet invasion forced Zia to view the FATA much like the British as a 
buffer between the communists and Pakistan.  For the Pashtun on both sides of the 
Durand Line, mobilization against the new infidel was easily framed in the call for jihad 
and the mujahideen quickly became a beacon for the greater Islamist world that had been 
growing in the post-colonial era.  U.S. and Saudi money made keeping the FATA 
autonomous and allowing the mujahideen to use it as a virtual base profitable.  The 
concept of gaining “strategic depth” against Indian attack began to evolve with the goal 
of shaping a pliable Pashtun, Islamist ally in Afghanistan that could be leveraged by 
Pakistan toward Central Asia and Iran as well as its eastern neighbor.  Turmoil in the 
FATA following the Soviet withdrawal stemmed from these ideas and the use of 
Pakistani and foreign Islamists as the foot soldiers to achieve this goal.  Once again, 
expansion of national interests would move through the FATA by leveraging anarchy 
instead of attempting to control it. 
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Figure 4.   Mujahideen 
1. The Politics of General Zia ul-Haq 
The Zia regime was deeply committed to Sunni Islamization in response to the 
communist threat from Afghanistan and the ideological threat from Iran in inspiring the 
Shia population of Pakistan.  Zia’s Islamist political ideas were nested in a martial 
dictatorship that was shaped by the geopolitical context of the Cold War rivalry and 
ultimately served to change the frontier drastically.  Following the Soviet invasion, 
Pakistan faced potentially two hostile states on its borders.  The Soviet threat to South 
Asia pushed Pakistan and the U.S. onto converging paths and the relationship would 
serve immediate U.S. interests, while fostering Pakistan’s long-term state sponsorship of 
violent asymmetric action in Afghanistan, Kashmir, and India. 
Zia famously turned down President Jimmy Carter’s offer of $400 million in the 
form of economic and military assistance by referring to it as “peanuts” in the hope of a 
better deal from President Ronald Reagan.  Reagan obliged with substantial military and 
economic aid that would be matched by the Saudi’s in an effort to contain the Soviets and 
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their atheist ideology.  U.S. military technology going to Pakistan forced India to 
strengthen its military relationship with the Soviet Union and the combination of these 
actions kept Indo-U.S. relations strained for much of the 1980s.122  The increased 
military capability bolstered the security of Zia’s regime and the mujahideen jihad against 
the Soviets drove Zia’s policy towards the FATA to remain hands off as the Afghan 
Islamists mixed with the Pakistani Pashtun to eliminate any semblance of authority held 
by the Political Agents in lieu of loose direction from the ISI. 
While fighting an asymmetric battle with U.S. and Saudi funds in the frontier, 
Pakistan and India would clash over Siachen in 1984 and on their border in what is 
known as Operation Brasstacks in late 1986 and early 1987.  The significance of these 
minor skirmishes was to bring Kashmir back into the fore of the conflict with India and 
the introduction of a claimed nuclear capability by Pakistan.123  Amidst these tensions the 
Karakorum highway was completed, which was a road network that linked China to 
Pakistan.  The Chinese viewed the highway as a way to import oil by a land route through 
Pakistan; however, the Indian’s saw the road as a way for China to resupply Pakistan and 
attack India along two fronts.  Amid these complex regional and geopolitical 
developments, Zia remained content to profit from anarchy on his western border and 
was also confronted with much of the same domestic turmoil that plagued Bhutto. 
Domestically, Zia viewed secular political parties as “arbitrarily divisive and 
dysfunctional” as well as incompatible with Islamic teaching and called for Nizam-i-
Mustapha, a political system harkening back to the rule of the Prophet, to validate not 
holding elections, banning political parties, and extending martial law.124  The 
Islamization of Pakistan’s institutions included the army, the courts, the bureaucracy, and 
most notably the education system.  To ensure his regime could endure, Zia promulgated 
a Provisional Constitutional Order that stated the President could dissolve a group or 
organization that he deemed was “formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the 
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sovereignty, integrity, or security of Pakistan.”125  He cloaked his dictatorship in Islam in 
order to cater to the Islamist groups wielding newfound political clout due to their links 
to the wahhabi salafist Middle Eastern donors funding the jihad with substantial portions 
of the funding going to enhance the Pakistani military.  However, the madrassa networks 
would receive favor in the Zia regime and substantially influence the social and political 
landscape, specifically in the FATA. 
From 1980 onwards, madrassas received almost 10% of the zakat funds that the 
government collected.  These taxes, combined with generous contributions from the 
Persian Gulf, led to a tripling in the number of madrassas during this time.  More 
importantly, following the Soviet invasion, the “new genre” of madrassas “were equally 
if not more concerned with jihad than with religious scholarship.”126  Many of these 
madrassas found a home in the FATA and greater frontier area as a steady stream of 
refugees from Afghanistan were ready to give their sons to the jihad in exchange for the 
food and shelter provided by the madrassas.  The FATA suffered most from the madrassa 
culture as millions of refugees settled and became influenced by the narrow Islamist 
vision of uneducated mullahs now serving as religious leaders to a disenfranchised 
youth.127  JI and JUI now had a growing target audience and a government more in line 
with their ideology in which to exploit. 
2. JI and JUI Under Zia 
JI struggled initially in their decision to back Zia due to their democratic 
principles and promotion of civilian governance, but ultimately backed his program of 
Islamization to get rid of Bhutto’s socialist agendas and attempt to institutionalize Sharia.  
JI was also influenced by the marginalization experienced during the Ayub Khan martial 
period and as a result took on a leading role in the Council of Islamic Ideology.  Through 
the Council they formulated and implemented Islamic penal reform and gained access to 
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senior military officials, which became most evident during the Afghan jihad where the 
access to the military mobilized their resources to take on a leading role as liaison with 
the militants.  There was mutual manipulation between the military and JI that would 
continue throughout the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, but a split would surface as 
Zia’s regime remained distant from JI’s original political vision of a civilian ruled Islamic 
state and treated them as a political tool for support when convenient.128 
JUI and the Deobandis would have much more limited interaction directly with 
the Zia regime, but would establish their ideological dominance in the madrassas that 
proliferated in the frontier during the Afghan jihad.  The growth in the number of 
madrassas decreased the quality of the education and altered the face of Deobandism in 
the frontier by promoting a “freelance, franchise model” that empowered less educated 
mullahs.129  The jihad allowed these mullahs to function as political mobilizers that 
usurped the influence of tribal elders and the already nominal control of the political 
agents in the FATA and government officials in the NWFP.  The mullahs gaining 
prominence during the jihad harkens back to the British Raj, but the decentralization and 
simplification of the new mullahs role marks a stark difference in the scope of Islamist 
ambitions.  JUI activity in supporting this cultural shift marked a beginning to the 
problems experienced in the FATA today.  Mariam Abou Zahab called the emergence of 
jihad by the new splinter, violent radical groups from the larger religious political 
movements the “privatization” of jihad.130  This trend is best described by the Pakistani 
sponsorship of the Peshawar Seven and their role in facilitating jihad for the mujahideen. 
3. The Peshewar Seven and the Arab Afghans 
Zia instructed the ISI to reduce the over 50 Afghan Islamist groups that had 
established themselves in and around Peshawar to receive funding in support of their 
jihad to a smaller number in order to streamline the distribution of weapons and money.  
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The ISI identified seven groups to receive a majority of the support and these groups 
competed for their share based on successful operations against the Soviets.  Personal 
ambitions for power and ethno-linguistic rivalries as these groups vied for influence 
would shape the nature of the Afghan resistance from Pakistan as much as any united 
Islamist ideology.131  The role of JI and JUI in acting as liaisons between the ISI and 
certain groups of the Peshawar Seven would serve as a model later for many of the 
militant wings of Islamist groups conducting sectarian violence inside Pakistan and 
terrorist acts in Kashmir.  Three of the Seven Peshawar groups demand further 
description for their influence on the Frontier in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. 
The Hizb-i-Islami (party of Islam) group led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar received the 
most resources from the ISI through the overt support provided by JI during the course of 
the Soviet occupation and initial years of the civil war.  The ISI funneled much of the 
hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of new and more lethal supplies originating from 
the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to Hekmatyar.132  Hekmatyar’s group became Pakistan’s 
choice to install a Pakistan friendly and Pashtun led government in Kabul due to his 
Islamist ideology following the Soviet withdrawal in 1989.  Hizb-i-Islami (Hekmatyar) 
used Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns from the frontier in his attempts over the next four 
years to defeat the other warlords fighting to gain control of Kabul.  Pakistan eventually 
ran out of patience with Hekmatyar’s progress and shift allegiance to the Taliban under 
Benazir Bhutto’s watch. 
The Hizb-i-Islami splinter faction led by Yunus Khalis and the Harakat-i-Inqilab-
i-Islami (Islamic Revolutionary Movement) led by Nabi Muhammadi were extremely 
significant due to their links to JUI and their base of power as predominantly Pashtun 
mullahs.  Both groups were more traditionalist in their emphasis on adherence to Sharia 
blended with Pashtun custom than JUI would have preferred, but that was better than the 
Soviet alternative.  They operated primarily in the Afghan provinces along the Durand 
Line from their forward guerrilla bases tucked into the inhospitable mountainous terrain 
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of the FATA within Pakistani territory.133  These two groups recruited heavily from the 
madrassas in the FATA that were full of young Pashtun males from the southern and 
eastern provinces of Afghanistan.  These Afghan Pashtuns eventually combined with 
many of their Pakistani cousins to form the core of the Taliban in 1994.  Notably, Mullah 
Omar, the Afghan Taliban leader, and Jalaluddin Haqqani, whose network causes much 
of the resistance to the U.S. presence in eastern Afghanistan today, fought with the Khalis 
faction during the jihad against the Soviets. 
A significant factor that fundamentally altered the cultural landscape of the FATA 
that originated during Zia’s Islamization agenda and the Soviet jihad was the introduction 
of thousands of Arab Islamists into Pakistan’s frontier beginning around 1983.  Saudi 
Arabia and the ISI with approval of the CIA began transferring Islamic volunteers to help 
with the jihad under the operational control Abdullah Azzam, a Palestinian Muslim 
Brother who taught at the Abdul Aziz University at Jedda.134  The total number of Arab 
volunteers and extent of their participation in the actual fighting is somewhat in question, 
but as many as 30,000 jihadists were indoctrinated to some degree in a broader 
appreciation of Islamist thought as well as receiving military training in camps based in 
or very close to the FATA.  Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda formed out of Azzam’s 
Maktab ul-Khadamat (Services Office) and took their version of jihad global in the 
1990s, but the network that enabled their existence and provided their safe haven after 
2001 took shape under Zia’s regime.135   
4. Zia’s Legacy 
The Pakistani Pashtun that received guerrilla training and rudimentary Islamist 
education focusing on jihad in the FATA during the Soviet invasion would seek to find 
new employment in Afghanistan and Kashmir after the Soviet withdrawal.  Although Zia 
was killed before the ISI and Pakistani Army began guiding these radicals to foment 
violence in Kashmir and southern and eastern Afghanistan, his stamp was firmly sealed 
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on what would become of the frontier.  During Zia’s regime, military involvement in 
Pakistani politics and government became institutionalized and the state’s consistent use 
of their new asymmetric tools became embedded in Pakistani foreign policy as a result, 
even if they would not admit it.  Until recently, the central motivation for not integrating 
the FATA was its use in deflecting accountability from the Pakistani state in sponsoring 
militancy and terrorism. 
Zia’s legacy is one of the creation of jihadi organizations centered in or near the 
FATA that have caused greater instability in the region and world as a whole as well as 
propelling religion to a greater extent into Pakistani domestic politics.  The close 
collaboration of the Afghan and Pakistani Islamist groups resulted in a network of 
personal and institutional connections that transcended the geographic boundaries of the 
frontier.  The Soviet jihad was bolstered by thousands of JUI and JI sponsored Pashtun, 
Pakistani Islamist that fought beside their Afghan counterparts following military and 
religious training in one of the hundreds of madrassas in the frontier.  The state 
sponsorship of these militant Islamic camps led many followers to espouse a radical pan-
Islamic agenda based on a Salafi-Wahhabi interpretation of Islam that was at odds with 
traditional Pashtun culture.136  The Taliban would seek to merge the two, at least initially. 
D. THE TALIBAN AS A TOOL 
Following Zia’s death, the military establishment successfully retained its control 
of Pakistan’s national security agenda and foreign policy.  Their goals of gaining 
“strategic depth”, supporting secessionist movements in India, and gaining access to 
economic opportunities in Central Asia all involved using the FATA in the exact opposite 
way from how the British used the terrain.137  Instead of closing the door to the west, 
they wanted to open it to expand Pakistani influence toward Central Asia and add breadth 
to their militant training camps.  Nuclear deterrence against India and U.S. abandonment 
following the Cold War drove Pakistan increasingly down the path of supporting radical 
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Islamists as their asymmetric method to achieving these goals.138  Numerous militant 
splinter groups from the political arms of JI and JUI conducted terrorist operations 
internally directed at the Shia and in Kashmir against Indian interests, but the Taliban 
emerged as the tool of choice in expanding Pakistani influence in the west.  Integrating 
the FATA would have been detrimental to these goals by placing culpability on the 
central government in allowing sanctuary to the Islamist militants.  In the midst of 
domestic political turmoil, the military and ISI continued to covertly aid the militants 
while intentionally avoiding any change to the status of the FATA following the Soviet 
withdrawal. 
1. Pakistan’s Power Struggle 
Following Zia’s death and the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan’s policy toward 
Afghanistan altered very little.  Pakistan, with U.S. consent, desired the complete 
removal of Soviet influence in Afghanistan and to replace the regime in Kabul with 
Islamist forces loyal to Islamabad.  The Pakistani military manipulated the elections in 
1988 and 1990 in order to retain their grip on foreign policy by not allowing the PPP to 
win a majority and insisting that the weak “elected” government have military 
representation in the cabinet.139  This allowed the military to retain control of Pakistan’s 
national security agenda and direct the jihad toward its old nemesis, India, in Kashmir, 
the Shia domestically, and to continue its support, through JI, for Gulbuddin Hekmaytar 
and his Islamist agenda in Afghanistan. 
The outbreak of the insurgency in Kashmir in December of 1989 would test 
Pakistan’s fledgling democracy under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.  Bhutto and the 
military had a mutual distrust, but she responded to rising anti-Indian sentiment in 
Pakistan and allowed troop mobilizations along with ratcheting up her inflammatory 
rhetoric for two main reasons.  First, by supporting the insurgents, Pakistan could cause 
substantial material costs to India while suffering few costs themselves.  Additionally, 
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Pakistan’s incipient nuclear capability had “neutralized whatever conventional military 
advantages India possessed.”140  Indian Prime Minister, V.P. Singh, escalated the “war of 
words” in response to Bhutto’s assertion that Pakistan was ready to fight a thousand-year 
war against India by deriding, “that it remained to be seen if Pakistan could last even a 
thousand hours.”141  The heightened nuclear shadow drove U.S. diplomats back into 
South Asia to quell the rising tensions of a nuclear showdown despite their desire to 
retrench in lieu of the Soviet decline.  Then deputy National Security Advisor, Robert 
Gates visited both countries to organize a stand down in mobilization and notably told 
Pakistan than in all U.S. war-games concerning an Indo-Pakistani conflict, Pakistan had 
lost.142  The statement and realization of Indian military superiority, if not admitted, 
reinvigorated Pakistan’s goal of having a loyal government in Afghanistan to give them 
“strategic depth” in a conflict with India.  A loyal government in Afghanistan would have 
to be Pashtun and leveraged through tribal links in the FATA.  When the Afghan 
government lost its Soviet backing, Pakistan sought to wrestle victory from the turmoil 
that resulted. 
Due to the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 and subsequent termination of 
Soviet assistance to the pro-communist Najibullah regime in Kabul, Afghanistan quickly 
deteriorated into a civil war along ethnic and tribal lines as the Tajik northern forces 
seized control of the capitol.  At the same time, Pakistan was facing four simultaneous 
conflicts that would contribute to their support of the Taliban.  First, many of the 
Pakistani mujahideen that were fighting the Soviets transitioned to the insurgency in 
Kashmir against the Indian government over the disputed territory.  Much of their 
training was conducted in the FATA to push accountability for their terrorist tactics away 
from Islamabad.  Second, sectarian violence was on the rise throughout the 1990s 
between Shia and Sunni groups within Pakistan as a result of the struggle for influence in 
domestic politics.  Third, Pakistan’s domestic leadership was in a constant state of flux as 
the military and civilians struggled to work through the damage to what democracy 
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remained in the wake of the Zia regime.  Finally, and most importantly to the FATA, the 
Pakistani military and ISI were growing increasingly impatient with Hekmaytar’s 
progress in advancing the Pashtun, pro-Pakistani Islamist agenda toward winning the 
civil war in Afghanistan.143 
When Pakistan’s sputtering democracy “shuddered through another minor 
miracle” with a “semi-legitimate national election” and Benazir Bhutto returned to office 
in 1993, JUI had aligned itself with the winning party and thus gained influence within 
the ruling coalition.144  Bhutto’s Interior Ministry, led by Naseerullah Babar was looking 
for a new Pashtun group to revitalize the Pashtun movement to control Afghanistan as 
they saw the Tajiks as too friendly to India.  JUI was able to lobby to take control of the 
fight in Afghanistan through their access to the government and to succeed through their 
network of madrassa students that had grown and been indoctrinated with Islamist 
ideology and the glory of jihad during resistance to the Soviets.145  Benazir Bhutto was 
happy to support a fresh group in an attempt to gain some control of the country’s foreign 
policy by backing the organization that would become the Taliban.  At the time, Pakistan 
was not even discussing integration of the FATA and their actions in supporting the 
Taliban pushed the FATA further from integration by ultimately strengthening the nexus 
of Pashtuns on either side of the Durand Line.  These connections would set the 
conditions for sanctuary following the U.S. and NATO invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. 
2. The Taliban 
The breakaway faction of JUI led by Samiul Haq became a key conduit in 
mobilizing the Taliban due to his Dar-ul-Uloom Haqqania mosque in the NWFP as a 
major training ground for the Taliban leadership.  The Haqqannia madrassa instilled an 
individual Deobandi simplicity with a Wahhabi disdain for music and decoration to 
produce a student that projected his goal of eliminating any intrusions from modernity on 
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a pious Muslim life onto others.146  Many of the students at this madrassa were exiled 
Pashtuns from Kandahar including Mohammed Omar.  Mullah Omar and many of those 
that would become Taliban had become frustrated with infighting among the Pashtun 
warlords and a complete lack of justice and security in southern and eastern Afghanistan.  
In 1994, Pakistan gave them their opportunity to fix the situation and more importantly 
work toward expanding Pakistan’s influence throughout Afghanistan.    
The Taliban’s quick and violent actions in gaining control of Afghanistan have 
been well documented and will not be reviewed here, but the important failing of their 
regime was the lack of a vision for a functioning Islamic state.  The Taliban were much 
more interested in enforcing beard growth, prayer times, dress codes, and the elimination 
of music and film than governing the country.  The hardest working ministry by far was 
the Religious Police.  The Taliban brought reform without a base in Islamic or Afghan 
history and virtually lacking knowledge of the theological and political developments in 
the Muslim world in the twentieth century.  They took power without providing a written 
guideline for alternative government other than dictating lengthy lists of what cannot or 
must be done as a good Muslim.147  A closer look at the Taliban fighter will better 
explain how the initial success of the Taliban has influenced the FATA today and began 
the Talibanization of the FATA in the early and mid-1990s.    
A majority of the Taliban were Afghan and Pakistani Pashtuns who grew up, 
studied, trained, and fought together during the jihad against the Soviets for over 10 
years.  The typical Taliban fighter was between the age of 17 and 24 and was raised in a 
refugee camp close to the Pakistan border only knowing Afghanistan as a country at war 
with itself or an occupying foreign force.  Ahmad Rashid contrasts the Mujahideen of the 
1980s with the Taliban by describing the former as “men who could recount their tribal 
and clan lineages, remembered their abandoned farms and valleys with nostalgia and 
recounted legends and stories from Afghan history” whereas the latter where a group of 
boys that “had no memories of their tribes, their elders, their neighbors nor the complex 
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ethnic mix of peoples that often made up their villages and their homeland.”148  Even if 
the leaders of the Taliban in Kabul and Kandahar understood the nature of the tribes and 
ethnic groups of Afghanistan, their message could not help being lost in the 
implementation of their foot soldiers.  Additionally, the Arab Afghans would remain 
involved with the struggle for an Islamist state.  Mullah Omar’s decision to host Osama 
Bin Laden and Al Qaeda would complicate matters for the Taliban as they sought 
international recognition and local supremacy. 
Pakistan portrayed the Taliban as a “continuation in the genre of the Islamic 
revivalist movements” of the frontier and as “successors” to the “uprisings of the Faqir of 
Ipi, Hadda Mullah, Mullah Powindah and other Pashtun tribal and religious figures 
against the British.149  The difference was they were organized and supported by external 
forces and conquered terrain outside their tribal support bases while accommodating an 
organization with a global agenda.  Taliban success in the establishment of the Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan proved to be a façade of Islamist Revolutionary success that was 
not allowed to collapse on its own due to foreign intervention in the wake of Al Qaeda 
attacking the far enemy on September 11, 2001.  The resulting invasion of U.S. and 
NATO forces caused the Afghan Taliban leadership, Al Qaeda central, and other foreign 
fighters to flee into Pakistan’s western frontier.  The culture of jihad and radical Islamist 
ideology that permeated the frontier for the past 20 years, led the Pakistani Pashtun to 
grant these and other refugees sanctuary in the FATA.   
Despite supporting the Taliban’s rise to power in Afghanistan, Pakistan never 
insisted that the Taliban finally recognize the Durand Line as the international 
boundary.150  If Pakistan wanted to integrate the FATA, their ability to use Afghanistan 
to support their asymmetric militant training camps provided the opportunity to solidify 
the border and focus on their internal stability.  Instead, Pakistan chose not to pursue this 
course of action and left the FATA semiautonomous due to an increasingly independent  
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Taliban regime.  Once again, Pakistan’s desire to covertly influence the Durand Line and 
retain Islamist militants to use against India guided their actions in reinforcing the 
autonomy of the tribes in the FATA.  
E. SUMMARY 
Pakistan is a relatively new country that has never been left alone to straighten out 
its own house due to constant conflict with its neighbors.  There are no innocent countries 
involved in South Asia as an enduring security dilemma has placed the region in six wars, 
numerous skirmishes and subject to countless acts of violence since Partition.  The 
shadow of a dominant India in the east shapes every aspect of Pakistan’s calculus with 
regard to foreign policy and has heavy influence with most domestic decisions as well.  
Afghanistan would seem to be a likely ally as a fellow Muslim state, but the division of 
the Pashtun by the Durand Line has created a constant feud over the western border as 
well.  The FATA has never been integrated into the state and has been left semi-
autonomous because the ground and the people’s loyalty have been subject to the 
immediate need of Pakistan’s perceived national interests instead of the long-term health 
of domestic stability and social improvement.  
Jinnah and the post-Partition governments merely wanted loyalty from the tribes 
of the FATA and resistance to the idea of Pashtunistan being pushed from Afghanistan so 
they could attempt to form a nation.  Early administrations achieved this by continued 
payment of allowances and leaving the Pashtun to their traditions.  Zulfikar Bhutto failed 
to act when integration of the FATA might have been possible due to competing interests 
for loyalty from the tribes in response to renewed Afghan claims to Pashtun territory.  His 
initial push to improve the social and economic situation through the PPP’s socialist 
agenda ran counter to the traditional power structure and was derailed by resistance from 
Balochistan and the NWFP.  Zia intentionally turned the FATA into an Islamist militant 
training ground to garner monetary and military support from allies to secure his regime 
and the military’s place in Pakistani politics.  Integrating the FATA was never even an 
option under Zia as the idea of strategic depth developed and was contingent on pushing 
responsibility for any asymmetric threats away from the central government.  The U.S. 
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supported Zia in this endeavor due to a laser focus on the forest of the Cold War, but 
missed the fact that the trees were being corrupted against the West.  The mujahideen that 
were “dubbed by the Reagan administration as individuals sharing American values and 
aspirations” were realized too late to be “fundamentalist and anti-Western” in the early 
1990s.151  The Soviet withdrawal provided the opportunity to use the Islamist militants 
that trained in the FATA against India and to secure a pliable government in Afghanistan.  
Therefore, the post-Zia era leaders again chose to use the semiautonomous status of the 
FATA to generate increased pressure on India in Kashmir and support the Taliban while 
attempting push blame away from the central government.  The effects of two decades of 
active neglect shaped the FATA into the center of radical Islamic militancy that we see 
today after the Taliban was squeezed into the FATA by the events following September 
11. 
The significance of Islamist militancy as Pakistan’s tool to achieve its strategic 
goals vis-à-vis India and Afghanistan cannot be understated in its impact on the FATA.  
The relatively effective control that the military and ISI had over the violence of the 
militants under Zia and during the 1990s has recently disappeared due to a weak central 
government and influence from foreign Islamists.  The effects of this loss of control are 
addressed in the next chapter, but Pakistan’s willing use of the militants they created to 
achieve “plausible deniability” in Kashmir and Afghanistan served to change the power 
structure in the FATA fundamentally.152  The leaders of the mujahideen and then the 
Taliban began the process of replacing the khans and maliks and even the Political 
Agents in the FATA with the mullahs that had become the military commanders and had 
“acquired tools in terms of weaponry, manpower, and external patrons” to challenge 
power locally.153  Pakistan now faces an insurgency based in the FATA organized by 
these new ideologically driven power brokers and must decide what to do against an 
existential threat.  The concluding chapter attempts to answer this question. 
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The previous chapters described why no government ever tried to integrate the 
FATA and how they chose to influence the region with regard to their national interests.  
In order to explain why and briefly how the FATA must be integrated wholly into 
Pakistan, the concluding chapter first summarizes British and Pakistani policy in 
choosing not to integrate the FATA and identifies two trends that are applicable in any 
future attempt to do so.  Then it explains how Talibanization of the frontier occurred 
following September 11 and describes the geopolitical context in which Pakistan now 
must view the FATA.  Within this context, Talibanization of the FATA is explained to 
define the new social structure present throughout the frontier.  After developing an 
understanding of the new structure, favorable conditions to help affect integration emerge 
after control and reasonable security are established in the FATA.  If Pakistan continues 
to acknowledge the need for stability and social improvement on their western border, 
these conditions can be leveraged toward successful integration of the FATA into the 
complete writ of the central government with sustained political will domestically and 
continued international support diplomatically and monetarily. 
A. SUMMARY OF BRITISH AND PAKISTANI POLICY TOWARD THE 
FATA 
Britain and Pakistan chose not to integrate the FATA into the government of 
lands they controlled due to national interests of higher priority.  Britain maintained 
enough presence west of the Indus River and retained contingent access through strategic 
passes in order to present the Durand Line as a buffer from Russian encroachment into 
Central Asia.  The Russians never pushed far enough south during British rule to cause 
them to need to occupy and more fully control the tribes in the FATA, so they did not.  
Britain faced numerous violent uprisings in the tribal areas, but they never threatened the 
vital interests in greater British India.  Islamist militancy was tolerated due to its sporadic 
manifestations and the ease with which it could be disrupted.  Following Partition, 
Pakistan left the Pashtun to their traditions and offered continued subsidies while 
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consumed with tensions against India over the contested areas of Kashmir and East 
Pakistan.  Pakistan’s meager attempts to improve and potentially integrate the FATA 
were curtailed by domestic politics in the 1970s.  The Pakistani Government prior to the 
Soviet invasion faced less violence than the British from the FATA as domestic violence 
in the Punjab and Sindh as well as three wars with India where of a greater concern.  The 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan brought the U.S. and foreign Islamist groups to fight the 
spread of communism and jihad through the Pasthun tribes along the Durand Line.  U.S. 
and Saudi money supported the Zia regime and his efforts to Islamize Pakistan and 
strengthen the military while supporting and growing Islamist militancy in the frontier.  
The networks of Pakistani and Afghan Pashtun in the FATA fighting with the 
mujahideen during the 1980s carried over to form the backbone of the Taliban with direct 
support from Pakistan’s government and military.  The continued use of the FATA to 
protect and train Islamist militants throughout the 1990s and 2000s in order to support 
Pakistan’s national security interests presents a reality whereby Pakistan has actually 
pushed the FATA further away from integration in the past 33 years. 
Two themes come out of the case studies that may help answer the question of 
how to integrate the FATA should this course of action finally be attempted.  First, the 
tribes desire to be equally and proportionally represented when decisions about their land 
and money are concerned.  A limited ability to leverage tribal dynamics and a lack of will 
to promote this integration are what have been lacking in the past.  The jirga system is a 
democratic process in its own right showing that the concept of voting on decisions is 
something very familiar to the Pashtun within their traditional consensus building 
process.  Leveraging these tendencies already in practice can get the tribes involved in 
integrated governance if acceptable security is first established.  Second, the tribes 
understand economics.  They have either been paid off or extracted what they wanted 
from soft targets throughout their history.  If the domestic will and international funding 
to truly improve the socioeconomic situation in the frontier is committed then there is no 
reason to believe the tribes cannot be convinced to receive the improvements with the 
right approach. 
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Arguments saying that the Pashtun are too independent to be governed, based on 
the fact that no one ever ruled them before, ignore the fact that no one has ever really 
tried to do so.  Nuri calls the “fiercely independent” argument a “red herring” that seeks 
to “overestimate their strength, indulge in historical determinism and (use) it as an alibi to 
shirk national responsibilities.”154  Shahid Burki asserts that “history is no longer a very 
effective guide for defining Pakistan’s raison d’être” and the same can be said for 
Pakistan’s approach to the FATA.155  The turmoil of the last 30 years of war in 
Afghanistan and the radical Islamism that has infected the region as a result demand that 
the distribution of political power and participation in political decision-making be 
addressed in order to move Pakistan toward integrating the FATA.   
Before addressing a strategy for integration, a discussion of the current status of 
the FATA is necessary.  The next section describes how Talibanization occurred 
following Septermber 11 and changed the social structure to a degree that is now 
favorable for Pakistani intervention.  The coercive control established by the Islamist 
militants has now alienated the population and can be leveraged by the Pakistani 
government to facilitate integration of the FATA if political will and pragmatic 
diplomacy are the course of action that Pakistan finally chooses.  Talibanization of the 
FATA has created the need and opportunity for Pakistan to make the first attempt at 
integrating the FATA successful. 
B. TALIBANIZATION OF THE FATA 
Following September 11, 2001, the social and economic structure of the FATA 
changed from benefitting from their autonomous status through the weapons, drugs, and 
money flowing back and forth across the border with Afghanistan to an occupation by a 
“multilayered terrorist cake” that continued to provide profit, but demanded new rules.156  
The FATA became “terrorism central” as the Afghan Taliban, Islamist militants from 
Central Asia, Chechnya, Africa, China, and Kashmir, as well as AQ and Bin Laden 
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moved first into South Waziristan and then expanded.  Jalaluddin Haqqani expedited 
sanctuary in the southern frontier for this myriad of Islamist militants as the Pakistani 
military left this portion of the frontier open by concentrating their forces in the northern 
agencies of Khyber and Kurram.157  David Kilcullen describes this “infection” as “both 
AQ and the Taliban, as well as AQ-allied foreign fighters” burrowing “deeply into tribal 
society, through activities such as intermarriage with local tribes, co-opting of local 
leaders, purchase and operation of businesses and other services, charity activities, 
sponsorship or partnership with madrassas, and settling local disputes.”158  The 
conditions were set for this assimilation during the 1980s and 1990s, but a stark contrast 
quickly developed as the Islamist militants were condemned from both east and west as 
Pakistan was forced to side with the United States following September 11. 
Thomas Johnson notes that “in pursuit of domestic stability and its foreign policy 
interests in Afghanistan, Pakistan has deliberately deconstructed much of the 1,000-year-
old tribal order” in the FATA.  He goes on to say that “while the decline of traditional 
tribal governance in the short run helped recruit many mujahideen, it also led to the 
radicalization of the tribal areas and the opening of the FATA to jihadist movements and 
radicals such as bin Laden.”159  The TTP formed from the local Pashtun radicals that had 
been influenced by the success of the Taliban and AQ.  When General Musharraf 
determined that the U.S. would “react like a wounded bear and attack Afghanistan,” he 
was begrudgingly forced to “unequivocally accept all U.S. demands” and publicly 
support the U.S. in their war on terror.160  These actions enabled the TTP to eventually 
condemn the Pakistani government as an apostate regime and opened up Pakistan to 
attacks from their new homegrown insurgency.  
The TTP has changed the social structure of the FATA by dismantling traditional 
tribal power structures and conducting violent coercive actions that have alienated a 
majority of the population by undermining most of what the average Pashtun enjoyed 
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about their autonomous status.  The TTP utilizes suicide bombings, political 
assassinations, public beheadings, the stoning to death of unveiled women, publicly 
displayed mutilated bodies, and a continuous explosive assault on girls’ schools to 
promote fear in the people of the FATA, the NWFP, and Pakistan in general.  Between 
2003 and 2008, TTP’s attacks resulted in over 1,200 Pakistani soldiers killed and more 
than 6,000 tribal men and women from the FATA and NWFP dead.  TTP violence also 
impacts outside the FATA and NWFP as demonstrated by the assassination of a former 
Pakistani prime minister in Rawalpindi as well as bombings in the capital of Islamabad 
and Karachi.161  In 2007, the TTP attacked the military directly with 36 of their 56 
suicide bombings aimed at military targets, but has increasingly attacked more 
indiscriminately against softer civilian targets.162  The number of attacks is on the rise in 
the two years since and escalated dramatically throughout 2009. 
The origins of TTP are linked to the Pakistani military’s attempt to eliminate 
foreign fighters from the FATA in response to pressure from the United States from 2002 
to 2004.  The Pashtun tribes in North and South Waziristan, specifically, were 
accustomed to relative autonomy due to the lack of governance historically absent in the 
FATA.  TTP began as numerous small, militant tribal groups reacting to government 
incursion by coordinating and using militant attacks against and at other times negotiating 
settlements with Pakistani military forces.  The former Afghan Taliban sympathizers, and 
some members, formed a distinct identity that gave nominal allegiance to the Afghan 
Taliban leader, Mullah Omar.  However, TTP created their own political space in the 
FATA and acted, often against Omar’s guidance, independently in Pakistan.163    
The tribes in South Waziristan that became the foundation for the TTP fought 
their way to a peace deal with the military in April 2004 under the leadership of Nek 
Mohammed Wazir.  The negotiated peace settlement included a promise from the 
tribesman to handover foreign Islamic extremists associated with AQ as well as, 
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astonishingly, money from the Pakistani government to pay debts the Waziris owed AQ.  
When the military withdrew pressure from South Waziristan and Nek Mohammed had 
his money, the group began to show its true intentions by immediately reneging on the 
agreement and expanding the territory under their control north toward the NWFP.  Nek 
Mohammed was killed by a hellfire strike in June of 2004 and Baitullah Mehsud took 
over as his successor at the age of 35.164  
On February 7, 2005, the Pakistani government signed a peace agreement with 
Baitullah requiring his pledge not to harbor AQ or attack government forces.  The 
agreement ultimately served to raise Baitullah’s stature among his tribe and allowed time 
and space to broaden and strengthen his forces in the region.  Baitullah’s credentials were 
solidified on Aug 30, 2007, when he captured over 240 Pakistani soldiers and held them 
hostage in Waziristan until he could negotiate a prisoner exchange for 25 trained suicide 
bombers in government custody.  In December of 2007, Baitullah was chosen to unify 
Taliban operations in Pakistan under the TTP by a 40-member Taliban shura that 
consisted of representation from all seven agencies of the FATA and most of the 
NWFP.165  The TTP had established itself as an alternative to the traditional tribal 
leadership of the FATA with support from the Afghan Taliban and the murder of over 
150 tribal elders for the “charges” of being Pakistani and American spies.166  
Significantly, in order to retain power, the number of tribal elders murdered is now over 
300.167 
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Figure 5.   Map of TTP controlled area as of May 2009. 
Despite some of the public comments of dissent between the Afghan Taliban and 
TTP, there exists a strong nexus of support between all the Islamist militants in the FATA 
at the local level.  Many current TTP and Afghan Taliban insurgents attended the same 
madrassas built and sponsored by predominantly Saudi Arabian Wahhabi Muslim donors. 
Additionally, Pakistani Pashtuns from the FATA frequently ventured into Afghanistan to 
help the Taliban enforce Sharia during their reign.  These relationships built in the late 
1990s were sustained and maintained throughout the removal of the Taliban from 
Afghanistan.  TTP still conducts limited operations across the border in Afghanistan as 
well as facilitating movement of men and material through the FATA, but over the past 
two years have turned their attention increasingly toward Pakistan.   
Baitullah Mehsud took a baya’h to Mullah Omar, but that did not stop Omar from 
condemning the TTP’s actions and reaffirming the Afghan Taliban’s priorities in early 
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2008.168  Mullah Omar’s spokesman stated they have no concern for the membership of 
“the Taliban movement in Pakistan” and that theirs (the Afghan Taliban) “is an Afghan 
movement and we, as a matter of policy, do not support militant activity in Pakistan.”169  
These public statements point to a distinct rift in the actions and goals of the Pakistani 
Taliban movement from the original.  The TTP’s terrorist attacks inside Pakistan are seen 
as an incorrect application of jihad that could be better used as part of the Afghan 
Taliban’s insurgency efforts.  AQ does not see TTP actions this way.  Starting with 
Baitullah, TTP leadership has chosen to align themselves more with AQ in having a 
“transnational outlook and clear ideological reasons for rejecting the legitimacy of the 
Pakistani state.”170 
When AQ was forced to flee Afghanistan and settle in South Waziristan, they 
immediately became a source of revenue to the Pakistani Taliban as they purchased 
security and space by freely distributing money to the local tribes. The Islamist radicals 
in the FATA are now “making money in the mayhem” through their control of the 
transportation mafia, weapons and drug smuggling, as well as sponsorship from AQ and 
other sympathizing donors.171  AQ bought a substantial amount of loyalty by paying 
generally 15 times more than the traditional price for goods and services and in one case 
renting a compound for $10,000 that usually rented for $17 to $20.172  Osama Bin Laden 
also had connections in the FATA from the late 1990’s and AQ leadership worked 
quickly to reestablish and build new relationships within the Pakistani Taliban. 
Two exceptionally important connections developed between AQ and the TTP.  
Baitullah Mehsud learned how to fight from Jalaluddin Haqqani.  Haqqani knew Bin 
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Laden from his days as a Taliban military commander north of Kabul and helped him 
escape from Tora Bora in early 2002.173  Mehsud and Bin Laden subsequently spent time 
together in South Waziristan in 2002.  Ayman al-Zawahiri fled from Waziristan to Bajaur 
Agency where he married a woman from the Mohmand tribe in the adjacent agency.  The 
marriage allowed him to develop a strong relationship with Maulana Faqir Mohammed 
who is in charge of the Tehrik, Nifaz Shariat Muhammadi (TNSM) movement in Bajaur 
Agency.174  Faqir is now number three in TTP and in charge of operations in Bajaur.  AQ 
leverages these relationships for sanctuary and training space in the FATA.  Additionally, 
AQ urges, finances, and supports TTP terrorist attacks against the “apostate” Pakistani 
regime that they see as “wreaking havoc” on Islam and are hopeful that a successful TTP 
secures a safe haven for AQ’s continued pursuit of transnational terrorism against the 
West.175 
The TTP, influenced by AQ and mimicking the Taliban, have succeeded in 
controlling large populations within the FATA and NWFP through establishing coercive 
shadow governments that have alienated the people through their extreme application of 
violence in enforcing Sharia.  These actions have replaced the traditional disequilibrium 
between the expectation of autonomy by the tribes and the central government’s 
administration of the provinces.  The new disequilibrium is found between the Islamic 
militants goal of power at the expense of social welfare and the freedom that was so 
much a part of the traditional Pashtun narrative.  Locally, intervention by the Pakistani 
government and military is now desirable based on being the lesser of two evils with 
regard to the FATA in light of the change in structure forced by the TTP.  Sentiment 
within Pakistan as well as regional developments now make the time more favorable than 
ever to intervene and first secure and then set the conditions for sustained development  
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and integration of the FATA.  The next section describes the current geopolitical context 
and improving regional developments that provide at least a brief window for Pakistan to 
effectively concentrate on controlling and integrating the FATA. 
C. CURRENT GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT 
Pakistan must take advantage of the current regional and international focus on 
stabilizing the FATA in order to mitigate the threat of Islamist militancy by leveraging 
the diplomatic and monetary concessions to integrate the FATA in the next five years.  
The United States shifted its focus of effort from Iraq to Afghanistan under the Obama 
administration.  On December 1, 2009, President Obama committed 30,000 more U.S. 
troops to help secure the Afghan population and accelerate training of Afghan security 
forces.  Increased troop levels are already putting more pressure on the Taliban indirectly 
by expanding NATO’s areas of influence in controlling the population.  Current troop 
levels will be maintained until the summer of 2011 at which time a decrease in troop 
levels will begin contingent on progress in Afghanistan and political will domestically 
within the U.S.  Pakistan must realize it has a limited window in which the Afghan 
Taliban, AQ, and Pakistani Taliban elements have reduced freedom of movement along 
the Durand Line due to Afghan and coalition force operations.  This commitment is 
indefinite, but will probably be sufficient to pressure insurgent elements at least through 
2015, which also corresponds to the significant monetary commitment contained in the 
Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, also known as the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill.  
The Act promises 7.5 billion over the next five years and dictates a significant portion be 
directed toward social and economic improvements in the FATA. 
Current operations by the Pakistani military in South Waziristan, Bajaur, and the 
NWFP are demonstrating much more resolve than 2004 and 2006 operations, which 
resulted in cease fire agreements that all failed miserably.176  Additionally, recent high 
profile captures of Afghan Taliban leadership including the second in command, Mullah 
Abdul Ghani Baradar, demonstrate a willingness by Pakistani security forces to no longer 
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separate the Islamist militants into “good and bad Taliban.”177  Pakistani actions against 
the Afghan Taliban are significant due to years of reacting to mostly internal militants 
and turning a blind eye to the Afghan Taliban despite continue pressure from 
Washington.  During the Musharraf regime from 2001 to 2008, the government was 
happy to profit and remain in power through a close, yet naïve relationship with the Bush 
administration.  Rashid stated “as long as Pakistan remained the center for Talibanization, 
terrorism, or nuclear proliferation, the world could not ignore the military regime or 
dispense with Musharraf.”178  Since 2006, both insurgent attacks and suicide bombings 
have increased six fold throughout the country, but primarily focused in the FATA and 
NWFP.179  These domestic attacks combined with the irredentist rhetoric of the TTP 
have pushed the military and civilian government closer together in their urgency to quell 
the growing threat of the Islamist militants.  Additionally the population in the frontier 
and the nation, despite anti-U.S. sentiment, are no longer supportive or tolerant of the 
TTP due to the coercive violence used by the militants to gain control of the FATA and 
the indiscriminant methods used in attacking civilians and government facilities inside 
Pakistan. 
Another recent development has the potential to allow Pakistan to focus more 
resources on their western border.  On February 25, 2010, the Foreign Ministries of 
Pakistan and India reopened talks for the first time since the Mumbai attacks in 2008.  
Although the talks were deemed not substantive by the regional media, the fact that the 
two countries are back at the table is progress toward at least a brief relax in tensions 
following Mumbai.  India’s major agenda is to urge Pakistan to combat Islamist terrorism 
directed at India.  The high profile arrests mentioned previously occurred before the 
meeting and seem to demonstrate a convergence of agenda that can be leveraged by 
Pakistan.  It is in India’s interests to not provoke any unrest on Pakistan’s eastern border 
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so that Pakistan can reduce the Islamist threat in the frontier for the security and 
economic benefit of the entire region.  Reinvigorated diplomacy with India, increased 
NATO operations in Afghanistan, and monetary aid from the U.S. have given Pakistan an 
opportunity to act in the FATA.  
The Pakistani military’s lingering agenda of strategic depth is one hurdle that will 
be difficult to overcome.  Understandably, Pakistan and India are very concerned about 
what happens in Afghanistan when the U.S. decides to leave.  India does not want an 
expanded safe haven for Islamist militants and Pakistan desires to guide and influence the 
Afghan government as an inferior, pliable ally.  Fortunately, the TTP have created a 
situation in the frontier that cannot be ignored for five years, while Pakistan waits for the 
U.S. to leave.  The TTP’s aggressive agenda has forced Pakistan to act.  Pakistani action 
must now look to take advantage of the altered social structure in the FATA and 
persistent U.S. presence in Afghanistan in the short term to greatly diminish the threat 
from Islamist militants and integrate the FATA as part of the NWFP.  The question is a 
matter of strategy in how best to proceed in this endeavor. 
D. WHAT MUST BE DONE 
As Pakistani military success gains momentum in the FATA, the government 
must take advantage of the negatively altered social structure and favorable geopolitical 
context in pursuing not only military success, but also complete integration of the FATA.  
In this endeavor, Pakistan must reverse a long history of autonomy with the realization 
that no government has had the opportunity and the need to integrate the FATA until 
now.  Pakistan’s recent military operations demonstrate an acknowledgement that they 
are fighting a counterinsurgency in the frontier.  Pakistan has realized that it needs to 
control the population in order to eliminate the insurgency instead of selectively targeting 
and negotiating with the insurgents in order to influence the people.  With the significant 
step of admitting they have a problem accomplished, Pakistan must first secure and 
control the FATA, then reform the status and governance of the frontier, and finally set 
the conditions for long term social and economic reform utilizing the significant funds 
promised in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act.  Integration of the FATA 
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completely into Pakistan logically follows the second step above, but as a practical matter 
will happen concurrently and not be fully realized until tangible results start to manifest 
themselves to the benefit of the population, which may take a couple of years. 
The first step in integrating the FATA is for the military to continue to augment 
the Frontier Corps and khassadars in order to systematically gain control of political 
space in the FATA.  Security forces must pursue four lines of operation to accomplish 
this mission.  First, adequate security has to be developed and maintained in areas where 
control has been gained in order to prevent militants from reoccupying and eroding the 
confidence of the people.  Second, the local militant leaders that have established shadow 
governments must be targeted to reestablish traditional local leadership and gain valuable 
information that enables targeting higher profile insurgents.  Third, as a supporting effort, 
security forces should continue to target core members of the TTP, Taliban, and AQ to 
diminish confidence in the militants and demonstrate to the people that joining the 
insurgents is not in their best interest.  Finally, Pakistan needs to open up access to 
NGO’s and media organizations to keep international consensus on the side of Pakistan 
and help deter foreign support to militants in the FATA by highlighting success and 
profiling the coercive methods existing previously.  All of these efforts are geared toward 
controlling the terrain by securing the population and the decision to act or not must be 
made with the second and third order effects that any kinetic or nonkinetic action will 
have with regard to popular preference toward the state.  The bottom line is that Pakistan 
has to control the FATA by sustained security efforts that grow policing capabilities 
internally and compensate the local security forces with improved pay and training.  Once 
a condition of acceptable security is established, with the expectation that it takes a few 
years in certain tribal areas, the Pashtun traditions of a democratic process and economic 
opportunism can be leveraged to provide a viable alternative to the Talibanization that the 
population now rejects. 
Talibanization was only popular in so far as an individual could profit in the 
absence of other alternatives and due to the coercive and violent methods used to demand 
support.  In reality, Taliban fighters “violate both Islamic and Pashtun norms” and are 
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deeply unpopular.180  The first step in addressing the disequlibrium between the social 
values and expectations of the people of the FATA is integration with the state.  Three 
steps must be taken immediately in legislation to set the conditions for action when 
security is established.  First, Pakistan should integrate the FATA into the NWFP.  The 
alternative of making the FATA a separate province would only continue the trend of 
marginalization due to the tribal areas already inferior social and economic status.  
Designating the FATA as part of the NWFP would allow the NWFP to gradually grow its 
security and governing infrastructure first to the more secure frontier regions and then 
west as different tribal areas are secured.  Removing the semi-autonomous status will 
make the Province and state responsible in total for the actions and well-being of the 
tribal areas.  Second, and closely related to the first, Pakistan must abolish the office of 
political agent and the FCR.  Many of the political agents no longer act without support 
or acceptance from the militants and even when effective distribute money and justice 
based less on fairness and more on gaining relative influence and personal power due to a 
lack of oversight.  The FCR is an antiquated system of justice that allows collective 
punishment with loose guidance on how large the collective unit is.  Making the FATA’s 
tribal areas districts within the NWFP and extending the Criminal Procedure Code can go 
along way toward providing oversight and tackling the corruption that is now pervasive 
in the FATA.181  Finally, the Political Parties Act should extend to the FATA to allow the 
universal suffrage granted in 1997 to be fully realized at the new district level.  Any fears 
of these parties being taken over by Islamist politics are unfounded based on the 
performance of the MMA from 2002 to 2008.  The MMA moved toward center and 
moderated their rhetoric throughout their time in power in the NWFP, and was voted out 
in favor of secular parties as the population realized there was little improvement under 
the Islamist parties.182  Even if traditional tribal leadership become the elected 
representatives based on tribal voting preferences, the Pashtun tendency toward 
democracy in the form of the jirga would now be leveraged for integration and greater 
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181 Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, 13–14. 
182 White, Pakistan’s Islamist Frontier, 72. The MMA was a coalition of five Islamist religious 
organizations that formed a political party to win elections in the NWFP in 2002. 
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political participation that gives a vested interest to the tribes in the benefits that the state 
can offer.  After legislative integration is achieved then it is up to the state to deliver the 
goods, fortunately Pakistan is receiving billions toward this end to jump-start the process 
over the next five years. 
The next step in bringing the social values and expectations of the FATA closer to 
that of the other provinces is significant development in infrastructure, schools, and local 
businesses.  Infrastructure is the first hurdle as roads, electricity and potable water enable 
follow-on efforts to grow.  The new districts in the tribal areas must see immediate 
progress and sustainment once new infrastructure penetrates the area in order to 
encourage collaboration and opportunities with the provincial and national government 
and mitigate the perception that the development is just another opportunity for the state 
to exploit the international community’s generosity for the gain of a few elites in 
Islamabad.  Second, the education system in the FATA must be improved as part of a 
larger effort to reform the entire Pakistani education system.  Stable conditions will go 
along way to setting the conditions for girls to attend and “ghost schools” to be opened or 
held accountable, nevertheless teachers should receive incentives to instruct in what must 
be “regarded as a hardship post.”183  Finally, small businesses should be encouraged with 
investment in local merchandise such as textiles.  The Enhanced Partnership with 
Pakistan Act initially called for reconstruction opportunity zones that gave duty free 
access to U.S. markets.  Although taken out of the final bill, there is still an opportunity 
to obtain tariff benefits if progress is made in securing the region.184  The Pashtun 
understand how to make money.  If legitimate opportunities to profit are presented while 
illicit activities are curtailed with an improved security environment, the tribes will figure 
out a way to take advantage of the new paradigm. The FATA will never be a 
cosmopolitan area, but very small, tangible steps in improving the social and economic 
                                                 
183 Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, 16.  “ghost schools” are schools where teachers often 
receive a paycheck, but due to a lack of oversight do not actually teach classes.  Additionally the Islamized 
curriculum has led to claims that public education is in some places more corrosive than the curriculum 
taught at the madrassas. 
184 Pakistan: Countering Militancy in FATA, 22. 
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situation combined with sustained security at this point are all that is required in the short 
term to mitigate the unfulfilled promises of Islamist militancy. 
None of the actions above are easy decisions for Pakistan to make.  They involve 
taking on responsibility for terrain and people left to a certain extent to their own devices 
throughout history.  Additionally, Pakistan would be attempting to reverse a strategy that 
served them well in contesting India and influencing Afghanistan for a relatively cheap 
price.  The money saved in supporting Islamist militancy for the past 33 years must now 
be spent to defend the legitimacy of the nation.  Pakistan can take solace in the fact that 
no government has ever failed to integrate the FATA because no government has ever 
tried.  Leveraging Pashtun tradition against the TTP’s inability to provide an alternative 
to integrate the FATA will disprove the myth of the impossible and bring greater security 
to Pakistan and the region. 
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